Do these systems avoid the strategic voting that plagues American elections? No. For example, both Single Transferable Vote and Condorcet voting sometimes provide incentives to rank a candidate with a greater chance of winning higher than a candidate you prefer—that is, the same “vote Gore instead of Nader” dilemma you get in traditional first-past-the-post.
Depends—whether you get that dilemma with Condorcet methods depends on how exactly you handle tied ranks. If you require a full majority (>50% of votes) to declare one candidate defeats another, you can create a Condorcet system that doesn’t have that problem.
Depends—whether you get that dilemma with Condorcet methods depends on how exactly you handle tied ranks. If you require a full majority (>50% of votes) to declare one candidate defeats another, you can create a Condorcet system that doesn’t have that problem.