You can’t rationally plan to move your beliefs in a particular direction.
nit: you can coherently be quite confident of a small move in one direction, if counterbalanced by a slim chance of a very large move in the other.
Because stakes are not uniform in credences (rather they’re weighted by utility diffs!), you can sensibly ‘plan’ to move your beliefs (i.e. envision futures and ways to move between them regarding your belief levels).
A more concrete example could be deliberately trying to falsify a loadbearing model assumption—perhaps because the stakes of being wrong are sufficiently weighty.
nit: you can coherently be quite confident of a small move in one direction, if counterbalanced by a slim chance of a very large move in the other.
Because stakes are not uniform in credences (rather they’re weighted by utility diffs!), you can sensibly ‘plan’ to move your beliefs (i.e. envision futures and ways to move between them regarding your belief levels).
A more concrete example could be deliberately trying to falsify a loadbearing model assumption—perhaps because the stakes of being wrong are sufficiently weighty.