Because it is often easy to detect the operation of motivated belief formation in others, we tend to disbelieve the conclusions reached in this way, without pausing to see whether the evidence might in fact justify them. Until around 2009 I believed, with most of my friends, that on a scale of danger from 0 to 10 (the most dangerous), global warming scored around 7 or 8. Since the recent revelations I believe that 10 is the appropriate number. The reason for my misperception of the evidence was not an idealistic belief that economic growth could have no downsides. In that case, I would simply have been victim of wishful thinking or self-deception. Rather, I was misled by the hysterical character of those who claimed all along that global warming scored 10. My ignorance of their claims was not entirely irrational. On average, it makes sense to discount the claims of the manifestly hysterical. Yet even hysterics can be right, albeit for the wrong reasons. Because I sensed and still believe that many of these fierce environmentalists would have said the same regardless of the evidence, I could not believe that what they said did in fact correspond to the evidence. I made the mistake of thinking of them as a clock that is always one hour late rather than as a broken clock that shows the right time twice a day.
Jane Elmer, Explaining Anti-Social Behavior: More Amps and Volts for the Social Sciences
EDIT: In case it wasn’t clear, I disagree that “it is often easy to detect the operation of motivated belief formation in others”. Also, when your opponents strongly believe that they are right and are trying to prevent a great harm (whether they have good arguments or not), this often feels from the inside like they are “manifestly hysterical”.
Until around 1990 I believed, with most of my friends, that on a scale
of evil from 0 to 10 (the worst), [$POLITICAL_BELIEF] scored around
7 or 8. Since the recent revelations I believe that 10 is the
appropriate number. The reason for my misperception of the evidence
was not an idealistic belief that [$POLITICAL_BELIEF] was a worthy
ideal that had been betrayed by actual [proponents of
$POLITICAL_BELIEF]. In that case, I would simply have been victim of
wishful thinking or self-deception. Rather, I was misled by the
hysterical character of those who claimed all along that
[$POLITICAL_BELIEF] scored 10. My ignorance of their claims was not
entirely irrational. On average, it makes sense to discount the claims
of the manifestly hysterical. Yet even hysterics can be right, albeit
for the wrong reasons. Because I sensed and still believe that many of
these fierce [opponents of $POLITICAL_BELIEF] would have said the
same regardless of the evidence, I could not believe that what they
said did in fact correspond to the evidence.
I’m saying that I think the original quote (which I did think was good)
would have been improved qua Rationality Quote by removing the specific
political content from it. (Much like the “Is Nixon a pacifist?”
problem would
have been improved by coming up with an example that didn’t involve
Republicans.)
I think the problems associated with providing concrete political examples are in this case mitigated by the author’s decision to criticize people on opposite sides of the political debate (Soviet communists and hysterical anti-communists), and by the author’s admission that his former political beliefs were mistaken to a certain degree.
I was substituting “[$POLITICAL_BELIEF]” for “Communism”, which is
what Pablo_Stafforini’s
quote
referred to.
But I could also use it for “global warming” without making a statement
against anthropogenic climate change, considering that even people who
believe the science on climate change is mostly settled can also believe
that
Jane Elmer, Explaining Anti-Social Behavior: More Amps and Volts for the Social Sciences
EDIT: In case it wasn’t clear, I disagree that “it is often easy to detect the operation of motivated belief formation in others”. Also, when your opponents strongly believe that they are right and are trying to prevent a great harm (whether they have good arguments or not), this often feels from the inside like they are “manifestly hysterical”.
Or just:
How is having a paragraph that applies to [$POLITICAL_BELIEF] not the same as making a fully general argument?
Or are you just saying that the original statement about Communism was a fully general argument?
I’m saying that I think the original quote (which I did think was good) would have been improved qua Rationality Quote by removing the specific political content from it. (Much like the “Is Nixon a pacifist?” problem would have been improved by coming up with an example that didn’t involve Republicans.)
I think the problems associated with providing concrete political examples are in this case mitigated by the author’s decision to criticize people on opposite sides of the political debate (Soviet communists and hysterical anti-communists), and by the author’s admission that his former political beliefs were mistaken to a certain degree.
True.
I do appreciate the correct classification of global warming as a political belief :-D
I was substituting “[$POLITICAL_BELIEF]” for “Communism”, which is what Pablo_Stafforini’s quote referred to.
But I could also use it for “global warming” without making a statement against anthropogenic climate change, considering that even people who believe the science on climate change is mostly settled can also believe that
climate change is political in the “Politics is the Mind-Killer” sense
how we should respond to climate change is in large part a political question