In this philosophy, we only perceive “color” as a “special experience” because we do not realize that the same is true for all of our senses
Ye-e-e-s, but the standard qualiaphilic take is that all the other sense are problematic as well. You think you are levelling
down, but you are levelling up.
In addition, this hypothesis is definitely testable. I made a claim above. Create a new sensory input / type of stimuli, and we will perceive a “new” qualia that was never perceived before,
That isn’t a test of reductionism, etc, since many of the alternatives make the same prediction. For instance, David Chalmer’s theory that qualia are non-physical properties that supervene on the physical properties of the brain.
That isn’t a test of reductionism, etc, since many of the alternatives make the same prediction. For instance, David Chalmer’s theory that qualia are non-physical properties that supervene on the physical properties of the brain.
True, it isn’t a particularly specific test that supports all the common views of most LW users. That is not its intended purpose.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings for the express purpose of allowing some specific subset of possible complex causal systems to have more stuff that sets them apart from other complex causal systems, just because the former are able to causally build abstract model of parts of their own system and would have internal causal patterns abstractly modeled as “negative reinforcement” that they causally attempt to avoid being fired if these aforementioned “qualia” building blocks didn’t set them apart from the latter kind of complex systems...
… but I guess it does sound kind of obviously silly when you phrase it from a reductionist perspective.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings for the express purpose of allowing some specific subset of possible complex causal systems to have more stuff that sets them apart from other complex causal systems,
But it doesn’t. It just establishes that if they, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected
from identity theory. Admitedly it seems redundant to have a non physical extra ingredient that nonetheless
just shadows what brains are doing physicallly. I think that’s a flaw in Chalmers’ theory. But its conceptual,
not empirical.
“It just establishes that if they exist, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory.”
But thats not the whole problem. It establishes they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory, and Chalmerserian dualism, and a bunch of other theories (but maybe not
Cartesian dualism).
Tests need to distinguish between theories, and yours doesn’t.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings
Since qualia describe an event (in a sense), I think that if they’re ever found to have measurable existence, they’ll not be so much what a gluon is to “top-quark”, but more something like what division is to the real numbers...
That is exactly—if I interpret your comment charitably—what my hypothesis concludes and what I want to test with the proposed experiment in the grand-grand-parent.
Is there a short explanation of why I ought to reject an analogous theory that algorithms are non-physical properties that supervene on the physical properties of systems that implement those algorithms?
Or, actually, backing up… ought I reject such a theory, from Chalmer et al’s perspective? Or is “1+1=2” a nonphysical property of certain systems (say, two individual apples placed alongside each other) in the same sense that “red” is?
Is there a short explanation of why I ought to reject an analogous theory that algorithms are non-physical properties that supervene on the physical properties of systems that implement those algorithms?
Yes: algorithms are entirely predictable from, and understandable in terms of, their physical realisations.
Yes: algorithms are entirely predictable from, and understandable in terms of, their physical realisations.
Now I’m confused: what you just said is a description of a ‘supervenient’ relation. Are you saying that anytime X is said to supervene on Y, we should reject the theory which features X’s?
No. Supervence is an ontologically neutral relationship. In Chalmer’s theory, qualia supervene on brain states,
so novel brain states will lead to novvel qualia. In identity theory, qualia superven on brain states, so ditto. So
the Novel Qualia test does not distinguish the one from the other. The argument for qualia being non-physical
properties, as opposed to algorithms, is down to their redubility, or lack thereof, not supervenience.
Yes: algorithms are entirely predictable from, and understandable in terms of, their physical realisations.
This is not really true, at least without adding some pretty restrictive conditions. By using “joke interpretations”, as pointed out by Searle and Putnam, one could assert that a huge number of “algorithms” supervene on any large-enough physical object.
I mean, sure, the fact that a circuit implementing the algorithm “1+1=2” returns “2″ given the instruction to execute “1+1” is entirely predictable, much as the fact that a mouse conditioned to avoid red will avoid a red room is predictable. Absolutely agreed.
But as I understand the idea of qualia, the claim is that the mouse’s predictable behavior with respect to a red room (and the neural activity that gives rise to it) is not a complete description of what’s going on… there is also the mouse’s experience of red, which is an entirely separate, nonphysical, fact about the event, which cannot be explained by current physics even in principle. (Or maybe it turns out mice don’t have an experience of red, but humans certainly do, or at least I certainly do.) Right?
Which, OK. But I also have the experience of seeing two things, just like I have the experience of seeing a red thing. On what basis do I justify the claim that that experience is completely described by a description of the physical system that calculates “2”? How do I know that my experience of 2 isn’t an entirely separate nonphysical fact about the event which cannot be explained by current physics even in principle?
Ye-e-e-s, but the standard qualiaphilic take is that all the other sense are problematic as well. You think you are levelling down, but you are levelling up.
That isn’t a test of reductionism, etc, since many of the alternatives make the same prediction. For instance, David Chalmer’s theory that qualia are non-physical properties that supervene on the physical properties of the brain.
True, it isn’t a particularly specific test that supports all the common views of most LW users. That is not its intended purpose.
The purpose is to establish that “qualia” are not ontologically basic building blocks of the universe sprung into existence alongside up-quarks and charmings for the express purpose of allowing some specific subset of possible complex causal systems to have more stuff that sets them apart from other complex causal systems, just because the former are able to causally build abstract model of parts of their own system and would have internal causal patterns abstractly modeled as “negative reinforcement” that they causally attempt to avoid being fired if these aforementioned “qualia” building blocks didn’t set them apart from the latter kind of complex systems...
… but I guess it does sound kind of obviously silly when you phrase it from a reductionist perspective.
But it doesn’t. It just establishes that if they, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory. Admitedly it seems redundant to have a non physical extra ingredient that nonetheless just shadows what brains are doing physicallly. I think that’s a flaw in Chalmers’ theory. But its conceptual, not empirical.
I… err… what? My mastery of the English language is insufficient to compute the meaning of the I-assume-is-a sentence above.
I meant
“It just establishes that if they exist, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory.”
But thats not the whole problem. It establishes they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory, and Chalmerserian dualism, and a bunch of other theories (but maybe not Cartesian dualism).
Tests need to distinguish between theories, and yours doesn’t.
Hmm. I thought it did. I guess I need to review a few things.
Since qualia describe an event (in a sense), I think that if they’re ever found to have measurable existence, they’ll not be so much what a gluon is to “top-quark”, but more something like what division is to the real numbers...
That is exactly—if I interpret your comment charitably—what my hypothesis concludes and what I want to test with the proposed experiment in the grand-grand-parent.
Is there a short explanation of why I ought to reject an analogous theory that algorithms are non-physical properties that supervene on the physical properties of systems that implement those algorithms?
Or, actually, backing up… ought I reject such a theory, from Chalmer et al’s perspective? Or is “1+1=2” a nonphysical property of certain systems (say, two individual apples placed alongside each other) in the same sense that “red” is?
Yes: algorithms are entirely predictable from, and understandable in terms of, their physical realisations.
Now I’m confused: what you just said is a description of a ‘supervenient’ relation. Are you saying that anytime X is said to supervene on Y, we should reject the theory which features X’s?
No. Supervence is an ontologically neutral relationship. In Chalmer’s theory, qualia supervene on brain states, so novel brain states will lead to novvel qualia. In identity theory, qualia superven on brain states, so ditto. So the Novel Qualia test does not distinguish the one from the other. The argument for qualia being non-physical properties, as opposed to algorithms, is down to their redubility, or lack thereof, not supervenience.
This is not really true, at least without adding some pretty restrictive conditions. By using “joke interpretations”, as pointed out by Searle and Putnam, one could assert that a huge number of “algorithms” supervene on any large-enough physical object.
Are they?
I mean, sure, the fact that a circuit implementing the algorithm “1+1=2” returns “2″ given the instruction to execute “1+1” is entirely predictable, much as the fact that a mouse conditioned to avoid red will avoid a red room is predictable. Absolutely agreed.
But as I understand the idea of qualia, the claim is that the mouse’s predictable behavior with respect to a red room (and the neural activity that gives rise to it) is not a complete description of what’s going on… there is also the mouse’s experience of red, which is an entirely separate, nonphysical, fact about the event, which cannot be explained by current physics even in principle. (Or maybe it turns out mice don’t have an experience of red, but humans certainly do, or at least I certainly do.) Right?
Which, OK. But I also have the experience of seeing two things, just like I have the experience of seeing a red thing. On what basis do I justify the claim that that experience is completely described by a description of the physical system that calculates “2”? How do I know that my experience of 2 isn’t an entirely separate nonphysical fact about the event which cannot be explained by current physics even in principle?