You’re right, we’re starting to go around in circles. So we should wrap this up. I’ll just address what seems to be the main point.
I find it obvious that there is a huge, important aspect of what it is to be in pain that [your definition] completely misses.
This is the crux of our disagreement, and is unlikely to change. But you still seem to misunderstand me slightly, so maybe we can still make progress.
You have decided that pain is a certain kind of behaviour displayed by entities other than yourself and seen from the outside, and you have coded that up.
No, I have decided that pain is any stimulus—that is, a feeling—that causes a certain kind of behavior. This is not splitting hairs. It is relevant, because you keep telling me that my view doesn’t account for feelings, when it is all about feelings! What you really mean is that my view doesn’t account for qualia, which really just means I’m being consistent, because I don’t believe in qualia.
you can’t prefer to personally have certain experiences if there is no such thing as subjective experience.
Here for example, you seem to be equivocating between “experience” and “subjective experience”. If “subjective experience” means the same thing as “experience”, then I don’t think there is no such thing as subjective experience. But if “subjective experience” means something different, like “qualia”, then this statement doesn’t follow at all.
P.S. This may be off-point, but I just have to say, this:
I inspect the code, and find nothing that relates in any way to how I introspect pain or any other feeling.
...is because the code has no capacity for introspection—not because it has no capacity for pain.
Edit: maybe this last point presents room for common ground, like: “Qualia is awareness of ones own feelings, and therefore is possessed by anything that can accurately report on how it is responding to stimuli.”?
No, I have decided that pain is any stimulus—that is, a feeling
I don’t accept that all stimuli are feelings. A thermostat is stimulated by changes in temperature, but I don’t think
it feels the cold.
that causes a certain kind of behavior. This is not splitting hairs. It is relevant, because you keep telling me that my view doesn’t account for feelings, when it is all about feelings!
It is about “feelings” as you define the word, which is not general usage.
What you really mean is that my view doesn’t account for qualia, which really just means I’m being consistent, because I don’t believe in qualia.
Which is itslef consistent with the fact that your “explanations” of feelign invariabel skirt the central
issues.
However, I am never goign to be able to provide you with objective proof of subjective feelings. It is for
you to get out of the loop of denying subjectivity because it is not objective enough.
If “subjective experience” means the same thing as “experience”, then I don’t think there is no such thing as subjective experience. But if “subjective experience” means something different, like “qualia”, then this statement doesn’t follow at all.
“subjective experience” means “exprerience” and both mean the same thing as “qualia”.
Which is to say, it is incoherent to me that you could deny qualia and accept experience.
...is because the code has no capacity for introspection—not because it has no capacity for pain.
I don’t think introspection is sufficient for feeling, since I can introspect thought as well.
I also think that I am conscious, but you keep telling me I have the wrong definitions of words like this, so I don’t know if we agree. I would say being conscious means that some part of my brain is collating data about my mental states, such that I could report accurately on my mental states in a coherent manner.
You’re right, we’re starting to go around in circles. So we should wrap this up. I’ll just address what seems to be the main point.
This is the crux of our disagreement, and is unlikely to change. But you still seem to misunderstand me slightly, so maybe we can still make progress.
No, I have decided that pain is any stimulus—that is, a feeling—that causes a certain kind of behavior. This is not splitting hairs. It is relevant, because you keep telling me that my view doesn’t account for feelings, when it is all about feelings! What you really mean is that my view doesn’t account for qualia, which really just means I’m being consistent, because I don’t believe in qualia.
Here for example, you seem to be equivocating between “experience” and “subjective experience”. If “subjective experience” means the same thing as “experience”, then I don’t think there is no such thing as subjective experience. But if “subjective experience” means something different, like “qualia”, then this statement doesn’t follow at all.
P.S. This may be off-point, but I just have to say, this:
...is because the code has no capacity for introspection—not because it has no capacity for pain.
Edit: maybe this last point presents room for common ground, like: “Qualia is awareness of ones own feelings, and therefore is possessed by anything that can accurately report on how it is responding to stimuli.”?
I don’t accept that all stimuli are feelings. A thermostat is stimulated by changes in temperature, but I don’t think it feels the cold.
It is about “feelings” as you define the word, which is not general usage.
Which is itslef consistent with the fact that your “explanations” of feelign invariabel skirt the central issues.
However, I am never goign to be able to provide you with objective proof of subjective feelings. It is for you to get out of the loop of denying subjectivity because it is not objective enough.
“subjective experience” means “exprerience” and both mean the same thing as “qualia”. Which is to say, it is incoherent to me that you could deny qualia and accept experience.
I don’t think introspection is sufficient for feeling, since I can introspect thought as well.
Okay, I’ve tabooed my words. Now it’s your turn. What do you mean by “feeling”?
The conscious subjective experience of a sensation or emotion.
How do I know whether I am having a conscious subjective experience of a sensation or emotion?
You’re conscious. Being conscious of things kind of goes with the territory.
I also think that I am conscious, but you keep telling me I have the wrong definitions of words like this, so I don’t know if we agree. I would say being conscious means that some part of my brain is collating data about my mental states, such that I could report accurately on my mental states in a coherent manner.