I agree that classical game theory (to the extent I understand it) don’t describe blackmail. I disagree that the game theory definition of “rational” is always the best action.
Game theory (again to my best understanding) assumes optimal behaviour according to CDT. The problem with CDT is that it predictably don’t stick to commitments. This is predictably bad in many ways. See for example Parfit’s Hitchhiker, and there is a similar situation around blackmail or commitment to costly retaliation.
Because CDT predictably fails in these situations, I think it is wrong to claim that it’s always rational to act according to CDT. Rationality is winning after all.
I agree that classical game theory (to the extent I understand it) don’t describe blackmail. I disagree that the game theory definition of “rational” is always the best action.
Game theory (again to my best understanding) assumes optimal behaviour according to CDT. The problem with CDT is that it predictably don’t stick to commitments. This is predictably bad in many ways. See for example Parfit’s Hitchhiker, and there is a similar situation around blackmail or commitment to costly retaliation.
Because CDT predictably fails in these situations, I think it is wrong to claim that it’s always rational to act according to CDT. Rationality is winning after all.