What does the picture look like if we (appropriately) think of belief in terms of subjective probabilities? In other words, at the height of the consciousness folly, how many would have offered 999 to 1 odds against it? 99 to 1? 9 to 1?
It’s a good question, I have no idea. What is disturbing is that the few who endorsed the idea weren’t crackpots but very, very smart people. Most notably.
I suspect that no theorist in the field, except maybe for von Neumann and Penrose, would bet any significant amount of money at any odds you quote on consciousness being shown to be a necessary part of entanglement. Many would, of course, be happy to quote you some “reasonable” odds, as long it was your money at stake and not theirs.
Renormalize to take account of the diminishing returns of money contributing to utility and rephrase the bet in terms of utility, whatever the dollar amounts.
What does the picture look like if we (appropriately) think of belief in terms of subjective probabilities? In other words, at the height of the consciousness folly, how many would have offered 999 to 1 odds against it? 99 to 1? 9 to 1?
It’s a good question, I have no idea. What is disturbing is that the few who endorsed the idea weren’t crackpots but very, very smart people. Most notably.
I suspect that no theorist in the field, except maybe for von Neumann and Penrose, would bet any significant amount of money at any odds you quote on consciousness being shown to be a necessary part of entanglement. Many would, of course, be happy to quote you some “reasonable” odds, as long it was your money at stake and not theirs.
It’s the other way around for Penrose—he thinks that quantum effects are necessary for consciousness.
Renormalize to take account of the diminishing returns of money contributing to utility and rephrase the bet in terms of utility, whatever the dollar amounts.
Scary examples nonetheless, no?