If I haven’t misunderstood this comment, this is not Eliezer’s view at all. See the stuff about no universally compelling arguments though you don’t seem to be suggesting that such arguments exist, I think you are making a similar error;. a paperclip maximizer would not agree that achieving well-being and cooperation are inherently Good Moves. We would not inherently value well-being and cooperation if we had not evolved to do so. (For the sake of completeness, the fact that I phrased the previous sentence as a counterfactual should not be taken to indicate that I find it excessively likely that we did, in fact, evolve to value such things.)
I’m >.9 confident that EY would agree that with you that, supposing we do inherently value well-being and cooperation, we would not if we had not evolved to do so. I’m >.8 confident that EY would also say that valuing well-being and cooperation (in addition to other things, some of which might be more important) is right, or perhaps right, and not just “h-right”.
For my own part, I think “inherently” is a problematic word here. A sufficiently sophisticated paperclip maximizer would agree that cooperation is a Good Move, in that it can be used to increase the rate of paperclip production. I agree that cooperation is a Good Move in roughly the same way.
I agree that EY would say both those things. I did not mean to contradict either in my comment.
A sufficiently sophisticated paperclip maximizer would agree that cooperation is a Good Move, in that it can be used to increase the rate of paperclip production. I agree that cooperation is a Good Move in roughly the same way.
That is part of what I was trying to convey with the word ‘inherently’. The other part is that I think EY would say that humans do value some forms of cooperation, such as friendship, inherently, in addition to their instrumental value. I am, however, a bit less confident of that than of the things I have said about EY’s metaethical views.
Most variants of h-morality inherently value those things. Many other moralities also value those things. That does not make them objectively better than their absence. Note that the presence of values in a specified morality is a factual question, not a moral one.
Whether or not h-morality h-should value cooperation and friendship inherently is a null question. H-moralities h-should be whatever they are, by definition. Whether or not h-morality o-should do so is a question that requires understanding o-morality to answer.
If I haven’t misunderstood this comment, this is not Eliezer’s view at all. See the stuff about no universally compelling arguments though you don’t seem to be suggesting that such arguments exist, I think you are making a similar error;. a paperclip maximizer would not agree that achieving well-being and cooperation are inherently Good Moves. We would not inherently value well-being and cooperation if we had not evolved to do so. (For the sake of completeness, the fact that I phrased the previous sentence as a counterfactual should not be taken to indicate that I find it excessively likely that we did, in fact, evolve to value such things.)
I’m >.9 confident that EY would agree that with you that, supposing we do inherently value well-being and cooperation, we would not if we had not evolved to do so.
I’m >.8 confident that EY would also say that valuing well-being and cooperation (in addition to other things, some of which might be more important) is right, or perhaps right, and not just “h-right”.
For my own part, I think “inherently” is a problematic word here. A sufficiently sophisticated paperclip maximizer would agree that cooperation is a Good Move, in that it can be used to increase the rate of paperclip production. I agree that cooperation is a Good Move in roughly the same way.
I agree that EY would say both those things. I did not mean to contradict either in my comment.
That is part of what I was trying to convey with the word ‘inherently’. The other part is that I think EY would say that humans do value some forms of cooperation, such as friendship, inherently, in addition to their instrumental value. I am, however, a bit less confident of that than of the things I have said about EY’s metaethical views.
Most variants of h-morality inherently value those things. Many other moralities also value those things. That does not make them objectively better than their absence. Note that the presence of values in a specified morality is a factual question, not a moral one.
Whether or not h-morality h-should value cooperation and friendship inherently is a null question. H-moralities h-should be whatever they are, by definition. Whether or not h-morality o-should do so is a question that requires understanding o-morality to answer.
If so, I’ve badly slipped a meta-level.