Presumably you answered the question about Paris without needing to go look at Paris, or even its wikipedia page. If this is the case, then I would argue that the question about Paris and the question about 17 were both resolved, in your head, as propositions about your map of the world.
I agree that this is more or less common usage of the word “true,” when applied to mathematical statements and given some axioms. But we could just as well call this “the fleem property”—a mathematical statement has the fleem property, given some axioms, if it appears in a model of the axioms. After all, the word “true” is already used to talk about correspondences between our map of the world and the world—why would humans mix up the fleem property with truth?
Presumably you answered the question about Paris without needing to go look at Paris, or even its wikipedia page. If this is the case, then I would argue that the question about Paris and the question about 17 were both resolved, in your head, as propositions about your map of the world.
I agree that this is more or less common usage of the word “true,” when applied to mathematical statements and given some axioms. But we could just as well call this “the fleem property”—a mathematical statement has the fleem property, given some axioms, if it appears in a model of the axioms. After all, the word “true” is already used to talk about correspondences between our map of the world and the world—why would humans mix up the fleem property with truth?
I’ll make a series of stubs that present my answer soon.
The second stub is this.