the mere preference for being dead, for no reason at all, is irrational [because being alive is a prerequisite to rational decisionmaking]
I disagree. If you had no other preferences at all, then it would be rational, and I think Nozick would concede at least that specific scenario. I also think it might be possible to take this line of argument further. It’s not possible to conceptually evaluate what it’s like to NOT be conscious and to have some form of rationality and rational decision making going on, because our understanding of that necessarily is shaped by our own experiences and none of us can consciously remember what it’s like to be unconscious, by definition. If you can’t evaluate what being dead or being unconscious is like, you can’t get a preference on it one way or the other, in and of itself.
I disagree. If you had no other preferences at all, then it would be rational, and I think Nozick would concede at least that specific scenario. I also think it might be possible to take this line of argument further. It’s not possible to conceptually evaluate what it’s like to NOT be conscious and to have some form of rationality and rational decision making going on, because our understanding of that necessarily is shaped by our own experiences and none of us can consciously remember what it’s like to be unconscious, by definition. If you can’t evaluate what being dead or being unconscious is like, you can’t get a preference on it one way or the other, in and of itself.