I wanted to begin with a clear and “settled” case of how cognitive science can undermine a particular philosophical practice.
I’m not convinced you have done that; consider:
The problem is that the brain doesn’t process music in terms of musical instruments, but in terms of acoustic spectra, so musicians have been using their intuitions to search for something that isn’t there.
There is a disconnect there. If your “true rejection” of conceptual analysis is only based on implementation-level details of how concepts are stored in the brain, then ISTM that you will reject many other manners of discourse based on that criterion, that you’d otherwise accept (this being the first example that came to mind). Worse, maybe you make an argument that works now but will no longer serve later, if and when our squishy brains are replaced (or extended) by something which does store concepts definitionally (and that may sometimes make sense).
However, your article makes clear (and we already know) that there are sufficient reasons other than “how concepts are stored in the brain” to reject conceptual analysis. Namely, that it leads down blind alleys and fails to clarify what it was supposed to. Arguing about definition typically turns out to be a fruitless endeavor, irrespective of our neural architecture.
The classical view of concepts, with its binary category membership, cannot explain typicality effects.
That’s something of a straw man argument; as far as I can see you haven’t really tried to repair the classical view of concepts in such a way that it can explain typicality effects. For instance, you haven’t considered things like overloading—using the same word to refer to several concepts, which could explain the “fruit” results.
Remember that I don’t reject conceptual analysis in general, but only the flavor of analysis that assumes the classical view of concepts. I do this for the simple reason that the classical view of concepts if false. This is really not controversial.
as far as I can see you haven’t really tried to repair the classical view of concepts in such a way that it can explain typicality effects
Not in this post, which is already too long. If you want a discussion of attempts to fix the classical view, see the source I pointed to: Murphy (2002).
Worse, maybe you make an argument that works now but will no longer serve later, if and when our squishy brains are replaced (or extended) by something which does store concepts definitionally (and that may sometimes make sense).
That would be fine. Then that would be philosophy for machines or philosophy for post-humans or something like that, not philosophy for humans.
I don’t think I understand what you’re saying with the musical instruments example.
If it is, it doesn’t seem to me to be false by virtue of not corresponding to how the brain stores concepts. The notion of knowledge as justified true belief can be rejected by appealing to examples that (as far as I can tell) you could come up with even in ignorance of modern cognitive science in general, and typicality effects in particular.
You can reject the proposition “concepts are represented in the human brain in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions” without necessarily rejecting the proposition “it is useful to talk about concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions”. You’ve shown convincing reasons to reject the first proposition, and you’ve shown some counterexamples to the second proposition, but you also seem to be implying that if we accept the first then the second never holds, and that can’t be right.
In fact, it is useful in some cases to talk about concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (for instance mathematical concepts tend to have this structure).
The examples you give (of typicality effects and so on) are examples of concrete, everyday concepts (bird, fruit, fish, furniture), when really the argument you want to make against the classical view of concepts is about much more abstract concepts (knowledge, truth, justice).
I don’t think I understand what you’re saying with the musical instruments example.
Maybe that doesn’t really make sense. Allow me to retract that.
but you also seem to be implying that if we accept the first then the second never holds, and that can’t be right.
Ah. I can see how you might infer this from my post, but I definitely do not endorse that if we accept the first than the second never holds.
It is useful in many cases to talk about concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I use stipulative definitions like this all the time. But stipulated definitions aren’t the aim of “classical view” conceptual analysis.
The examples you give (of typicality effects and so on) are examples of concrete, everyday concepts (bird, fruit, fish, furniture), when really the argument you want to make against the classical view of concepts is about much more abstract concepts (knowledge, truth, justice).
Like I said, my post is already too long, and I provided references if you’re interested to read more studies on typicality effects.
I’m not convinced you have done that; consider:
There is a disconnect there. If your “true rejection” of conceptual analysis is only based on implementation-level details of how concepts are stored in the brain, then ISTM that you will reject many other manners of discourse based on that criterion, that you’d otherwise accept (this being the first example that came to mind). Worse, maybe you make an argument that works now but will no longer serve later, if and when our squishy brains are replaced (or extended) by something which does store concepts definitionally (and that may sometimes make sense).
However, your article makes clear (and we already know) that there are sufficient reasons other than “how concepts are stored in the brain” to reject conceptual analysis. Namely, that it leads down blind alleys and fails to clarify what it was supposed to. Arguing about definition typically turns out to be a fruitless endeavor, irrespective of our neural architecture.
That’s something of a straw man argument; as far as I can see you haven’t really tried to repair the classical view of concepts in such a way that it can explain typicality effects. For instance, you haven’t considered things like overloading—using the same word to refer to several concepts, which could explain the “fruit” results.
Remember that I don’t reject conceptual analysis in general, but only the flavor of analysis that assumes the classical view of concepts. I do this for the simple reason that the classical view of concepts if false. This is really not controversial.
Not in this post, which is already too long. If you want a discussion of attempts to fix the classical view, see the source I pointed to: Murphy (2002).
That would be fine. Then that would be philosophy for machines or philosophy for post-humans or something like that, not philosophy for humans.
I don’t think I understand what you’re saying with the musical instruments example.
If it is, it doesn’t seem to me to be false by virtue of not corresponding to how the brain stores concepts. The notion of knowledge as justified true belief can be rejected by appealing to examples that (as far as I can tell) you could come up with even in ignorance of modern cognitive science in general, and typicality effects in particular.
You can reject the proposition “concepts are represented in the human brain in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions” without necessarily rejecting the proposition “it is useful to talk about concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions”. You’ve shown convincing reasons to reject the first proposition, and you’ve shown some counterexamples to the second proposition, but you also seem to be implying that if we accept the first then the second never holds, and that can’t be right.
In fact, it is useful in some cases to talk about concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (for instance mathematical concepts tend to have this structure).
The examples you give (of typicality effects and so on) are examples of concrete, everyday concepts (bird, fruit, fish, furniture), when really the argument you want to make against the classical view of concepts is about much more abstract concepts (knowledge, truth, justice).
Maybe that doesn’t really make sense. Allow me to retract that.
Ah. I can see how you might infer this from my post, but I definitely do not endorse that if we accept the first than the second never holds.
It is useful in many cases to talk about concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I use stipulative definitions like this all the time. But stipulated definitions aren’t the aim of “classical view” conceptual analysis.
Like I said, my post is already too long, and I provided references if you’re interested to read more studies on typicality effects.