But people’s values changes over time, and that’s a good thing. For example in medieval/ancient times people didn’t value animals’ lives and well-being (as much) as we do today. If a medieval person tells you “well we value what we value, I don’t value animals, what more is there to say?”, would you agree with him and let him go on to burning cats for entertainment, or would you try to convince him that he should actually care about animals’ well-being?
Is that an actual change in values? Or is it merely a change of facts—much greater availability of entertainment, much less death and cruelty in the world, and the knowledge that humans and animals are much more similar than it would have seemed to the medieval worldview?
The more I think about this question, the less certain I am that I know what an answer to it might even look like. What kinds of observations might be evidence one way or the other?
Do people who’ve changed their mind consider themselves to have different values from their past selves? Do we find that when someone has changed their mind, we can explain the relevant values in terms of some “more fundamental” value that’s just being applied to different observations (or different reasoning), or not?
Can we imagine a scenario where an entity with truly different values—the good ol’ paperclip maximizer—is persuaded to change them?
I guess that’s my real point—I wouldn’t even dream of trying to persuade a paperclip maximizer to start valuing human life (except insofar as live humans encourage the production of paperclips) - it values what it values, it doesn’t value what it doesn’t value, what more is there to say? To the extent that I would hope to persuade a medieval person to act more kindly towards animals, it would be because and in terms of the values that they already have, that would likely be mostly shared with mine.
So, if I start out treating animals badly, and then later start treating them kindly, that would be evidence of a pre-existing valuing of animals which was simply being masked by circumstances. Yes?
If I instead start out acting kindly to animals, and then later start treating them badly, is that similarly evidence of a pre-existing lack of valuing-animals which had previously been masked by circumstances? Or does it indicate that my existing, previously manifested, valuing of animals is now being masked by circumstances?
So, if I start out treating animals badly, and then later start treating them kindly, that would be evidence of a pre-existing valuing of animals which was simply being masked by circumstances. Yes?
Either that, or that your present kind-treating of animals is just a manifestation of circumstances, not a true value.
If I instead start out acting kindly to animals, and then later start treating them badly, is that similarly evidence of a pre-existing lack of valuing-animals which had previously been masked by circumstances? Or does it indicate that my existing, previously manifested, valuing of animals is now being masked by circumstances?
Could be either. To figure it out, we’d have to examine those surrounding circumstances and see what underlying values seemed consistent with your actions. Or we could assume that your values would likely be similar to those of other humans—so you probably value the welfare of entities that seem similar to yourself, or potential mates or offspring, and so value animals in proportion to how similar they seem under the circumstances and available information.
Well whether it’s a “real” change may be besides the point if you put it this way. Our situation and our knowledge are also changing, and maybe our behavior should also change. If personal identity and/or consciousness are not fundamental, how should we value those in a world where any mind-configurations can be created and copied at will?
So there’s a view that a rational entity should never change its values. If we accept that, then any entity with different values from present-me seems to be in some sense not a “natural successor” of present-me, even if it remembers being me and shares all my values. There seems to be a qualitative distinction between an entity like that and upload-me, even if there are several branching upload-mes that have undergone various experiences and would no doubt have different views on concrete issues than present-me.
But that’s just an intuition, and I don’t know whether it can be made rigorous.
Is that an actual change in values? Or is it merely a change of facts—much greater availability of entertainment, much less death and cruelty in the world, and the knowledge that humans and animals are much more similar than it would have seemed to the medieval worldview?
The more I think about this question, the less certain I am that I know what an answer to it might even look like.
What kinds of observations might be evidence one way or the other?
Do people who’ve changed their mind consider themselves to have different values from their past selves? Do we find that when someone has changed their mind, we can explain the relevant values in terms of some “more fundamental” value that’s just being applied to different observations (or different reasoning), or not? Can we imagine a scenario where an entity with truly different values—the good ol’ paperclip maximizer—is persuaded to change them?
I guess that’s my real point—I wouldn’t even dream of trying to persuade a paperclip maximizer to start valuing human life (except insofar as live humans encourage the production of paperclips) - it values what it values, it doesn’t value what it doesn’t value, what more is there to say? To the extent that I would hope to persuade a medieval person to act more kindly towards animals, it would be because and in terms of the values that they already have, that would likely be mostly shared with mine.
So, if I start out treating animals badly, and then later start treating them kindly, that would be evidence of a pre-existing valuing of animals which was simply being masked by circumstances. Yes?
If I instead start out acting kindly to animals, and then later start treating them badly, is that similarly evidence of a pre-existing lack of valuing-animals which had previously been masked by circumstances? Or does it indicate that my existing, previously manifested, valuing of animals is now being masked by circumstances?
Either that, or that your present kind-treating of animals is just a manifestation of circumstances, not a true value.
Could be either. To figure it out, we’d have to examine those surrounding circumstances and see what underlying values seemed consistent with your actions. Or we could assume that your values would likely be similar to those of other humans—so you probably value the welfare of entities that seem similar to yourself, or potential mates or offspring, and so value animals in proportion to how similar they seem under the circumstances and available information.
(nods) Fair enough. Thanks for the clarification.
Well whether it’s a “real” change may be besides the point if you put it this way. Our situation and our knowledge are also changing, and maybe our behavior should also change. If personal identity and/or consciousness are not fundamental, how should we value those in a world where any mind-configurations can be created and copied at will?
So there’s a view that a rational entity should never change its values. If we accept that, then any entity with different values from present-me seems to be in some sense not a “natural successor” of present-me, even if it remembers being me and shares all my values. There seems to be a qualitative distinction between an entity like that and upload-me, even if there are several branching upload-mes that have undergone various experiences and would no doubt have different views on concrete issues than present-me.
But that’s just an intuition, and I don’t know whether it can be made rigorous.