I think that paper-machine is suggesting that utilitarianism isn’t in fact a common topic here because (paper-machine alleges) many LessWrongers believe that CEV is the correct form of ethics and CEV is not a form of utilitarianism.
I don’t think that CEV is commonly held on LessWrong to be the correct ethics, especially since it was originally introduced as a way to build an FAI, and not as a form of ethics at all. However, I might well hold CEV up as having the right kind of idea (combining preferences while allowing for change in beliefs). It isn’t well specified enough to be a morallity.
As peter_hurford says, it is pretty close to preference utilitarianism.
The sidebar of /r/utilitarianism mentions CEV as a kind of utilitarianism.
Oscar_Cunningham is more or less incorrect in his guesses about me. I didn’t allege that many LWers believe in CEV, I don’t believe CEV is the correct form of ethics, and I didn’t say anything about whether or not utilitarianism is a common topic on LW.
I don’t even know if CEV is a kind of utilitarianism or not—that’s why I asked.
CEV is more of an algorithm that is supposed to produce the correct ethics. I guess some people here would argue that the product will necessarily be a consequentialist form of ethics.
I don’t think there’s much use in distinguishing CEV from its results, as far as the “popular” usage of the term goes. Certainly the sidebar isn’t using it in this sense.
I have yet to see an argument that CEV (or whatever CEV produces if you like) will be consequentialist; indeed, sometimes I have seen people argue that CEV will value certain abstract things almost as if they were virtues, e.g., fun.
Did the post change? I don’t see any mention of CEV.
I think that paper-machine is suggesting that utilitarianism isn’t in fact a common topic here because (paper-machine alleges) many LessWrongers believe that CEV is the correct form of ethics and CEV is not a form of utilitarianism.
I don’t think that CEV is commonly held on LessWrong to be the correct ethics, especially since it was originally introduced as a way to build an FAI, and not as a form of ethics at all. However, I might well hold CEV up as having the right kind of idea (combining preferences while allowing for change in beliefs). It isn’t well specified enough to be a morallity.
As peter_hurford says, it is pretty close to preference utilitarianism.
EDIT: Wrong on all counts.
The sidebar of /r/utilitarianism mentions CEV as a kind of utilitarianism.
Oscar_Cunningham is more or less incorrect in his guesses about me. I didn’t allege that many LWers believe in CEV, I don’t believe CEV is the correct form of ethics, and I didn’t say anything about whether or not utilitarianism is a common topic on LW.
I don’t even know if CEV is a kind of utilitarianism or not—that’s why I asked.
CEV is more of an algorithm that is supposed to produce the correct ethics. I guess some people here would argue that the product will necessarily be a consequentialist form of ethics.
I don’t think there’s much use in distinguishing CEV from its results, as far as the “popular” usage of the term goes. Certainly the sidebar isn’t using it in this sense.
I have yet to see an argument that CEV (or whatever CEV produces if you like) will be consequentialist; indeed, sometimes I have seen people argue that CEV will value certain abstract things almost as if they were virtues, e.g., fun.
Oh, okay.