any relevant theory of justice had to be applicable
Any?
Yes, any. If you have a theory of justice that can’t be applied to the question at hand, it isn’t relevant to the question at hand. That doesn’t mean your theory isn’t a good one, it just means it has reached its limits. For example, a Rawlsian theory of justice has nothing to say about whether bananas are delicious.
To be clear, the just world hypothesis is essentially “whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.”
Not quite. That’s a theory of causality, not justice.
Well, that’s what the just world hypothesis states. You are fully entitled to view it as a theory of causality rather than justice, but you aren’t arguing against it by doing so. That is what I mean by “applicable” and “relevant.” If you have a theory of justice that neither supports nor contradicts the just world hypothesis, that’s all well and good, but it doesn’t speak to the questions I’m dealing with, i.e.:
What do people who believe in the just world hypothesis actually believe?
How should we approach the question of whether the just world hypothesis is true?
Is the just world hypothesis true?
Is the just world hypothesis useful to hold for the believer?
What is the effect on the world of people believing in the just world hypothesis?
Well, that’s what the just world hypothesis states.
Can you state it in less Biblical and more conventional and well-defined terms?
I doubt that the just world hypothesis specifies what kind of grain I can harvest after planting rye seeds and in a more general interpretation it boils down to “your actions will cause consequences” which is true but banal.
Third party here, but I’d consider the just-world hypothesis something like the converse of the golden rule: The world will do unto you as you do unto others.
The just-world hypothesis or just-world fallacy is the cognitive bias (or assumption) that a person’s actions always bring morally fair and fitting consequences to that person, so that all noble actions are eventually rewarded and all evil actions are eventually punished… The hypothesis popularly appears in the English language in various figures of speech that imply guaranteed negative reprisal, such as: “You got what was coming to you”, “What goes around comes around”, and “You reap what you sow.”
Yes, any. If you have a theory of justice that can’t be applied to the question at hand, it isn’t relevant to the question at hand. That doesn’t mean your theory isn’t a good one, it just means it has reached its limits. For example, a Rawlsian theory of justice has nothing to say about whether bananas are delicious.
Well, that’s what the just world hypothesis states. You are fully entitled to view it as a theory of causality rather than justice, but you aren’t arguing against it by doing so. That is what I mean by “applicable” and “relevant.” If you have a theory of justice that neither supports nor contradicts the just world hypothesis, that’s all well and good, but it doesn’t speak to the questions I’m dealing with, i.e.:
What do people who believe in the just world hypothesis actually believe?
How should we approach the question of whether the just world hypothesis is true?
Is the just world hypothesis true?
Is the just world hypothesis useful to hold for the believer?
What is the effect on the world of people believing in the just world hypothesis?
Can you state it in less Biblical and more conventional and well-defined terms?
I doubt that the just world hypothesis specifies what kind of grain I can harvest after planting rye seeds and in a more general interpretation it boils down to “your actions will cause consequences” which is true but banal.
Third party here, but I’d consider the just-world hypothesis something like the converse of the golden rule: The world will do unto you as you do unto others.
So is that, essentially, the idea of karma?
Karma is one flavor of it, yes.
As per Wikipedia:
If you accept this definition of the just-world hypothesis as a cognitive bias then your inquiry into whether it is true does not make any sense.