I wouldn’t call relative apathy about status signalling a “deeper problem”, on the contrary, I’d call it a virtue. Enough effort is wasted on endless social hierarchy competitions already.
I certainly don’t think status indifference is universally problematic, but was trying to point up the difference between “I’ve figured out that the people in my social circle/the norms I’ve been using are vapid and petty and I’m ready to move on with my life” and “I’m no longer inclined or able to participate in activities I find meaningful.”
The discussion, as I read it, had been about using fashion to attract partners and then giving up on being fashionable. In this case, I posited someone who started dressing fashionably specifically in order to attract partners and quits dressing fashionably when they’ve done so. Maybe they’ve had a revelation of the “my norms are vapid” sort, or maybe they’ve just accomplished their goals.
But thomblake had an implied question about whether anyone would actually leave a partner because the partner looked unfashionable. One possible cause could be that what made them initially attractive were other character traits/personality features that also led them to dress fashionably, in which case the partner might be have good cause for concern (the “no longer able to do activities” situation). P(!traits | !fashion) > P(traits | !fashion). So the other status gains I referred to would increase the estimate of P(traits | !fashion).
One wouldn’t leave a partner for no reason other than unfashionability unless one places such a high value on fashion that no other status gains could make up for its lack. But a partner who suddenly quits caring how they look might send up some red flags. (Absent discussions of updating norms, of course.)
It depends: I wouldn’t call not strongly caring about status as a terminal value a problem, but irrationally underestimating how important status is as an instrumental value for other goals is a problem (the stereotypical failure mode of nerds, and IME that stereotype does have a grain of truth).
It might indicate that something is irrelevant, but it was only stated that this “may be” an indicator of a “deeper problem,” i.e., various psychological disorders do have apathy, particularly a loss of concern for how one appears to others, as a symptom.
Why are you telling me what I can or cannot consider a virtue?
Consider any topic you are invested in, the degree of such ranging from “apathetic regarding topic X” to “highly invested regarding topic X”. Relative apathy about a topic translates to a greater degree of indifference regarding that topic / less of a stake in that issue.
Is it so inconceivable for you to be apathetic towards, say, antiquated traditions, and to consider that indifference as a positive trait, as a virtue? Some meditative frameworks strive towards apathy / indifference towards many areas in life, and regard such as virtuous.
but it was only stated that this “may be” an indicator of a “deeper problem,”
You misread the parent comment:
(...) then someone giving up on being fashionable may be an indicator of deeper problems than clothing, e.g., apathy about reduced status or lesser social awareness.
Apathy about reduced status and lesser social awareness were cited as examples (e.g., exempli gratia) of deeper problems. Even if the referent had been indicator, the “may be” would not be involved either way.
Why are you telling me what I can or cannot consider a virtue?
Ah, you may consider anything you like about anything. You may, for example, consider anorexia a virtue.
However, if simple indifference is a virtue, then I have a limitless supply of virtue, because I am indifferent to a limitless supply of possible objects.
“Lesser social awareness” is a recognized psychological impairment (it means “lesser than normal,” or “lesser” as in lessened for the individual), perhaps a developmental or affective disorder.
Indifference about status may be something we might laud, under some circumstances, but it can also be an indicator of depression.
Again, the operative conditional is “may be.” The word “apathy” is also important. That’s why I distinguished between apathy and indifference. Apathy is an abnormal indifference. Someone who is apathetic about food is anorexic.
The situation under consideration was someone “giving up on being fashionable.” That implies a change, that the person was concerned about fashion or appearance previously. Obviously, this might be the result of some turning to more important concerns, but, as stated, and with real people, a shift like that can be a symptom of a disorder.
So, Kawoomba, what is your concern here? What’s important about this topic?
Personally, I’m concerned about anyone who would think of apathy as a virtue. Apathy is a psychological condition, it is not “rational.”
Indifference may be rational. One who is apathetic will not even consider issues or investigate possibilities. One who investigates possibilities may decide that they are indifferent among a number of possible choices.
I might even be a fashionista, but on a particular day decide to wear those old torn pants and shirt, even if they are the “wrong color,” and so what? But that’s not apathy, it’s indifference. Apathy isn’t really a choice, it’s a disabling of the mechanisms that make choices and take action.
At least that’s what “apathy” means to me. When I’m apathetic, I don’t want to get up in the morning. It’s all too much trouble. It could mean anything from not enough coffee to girlfriend deficiency anemia.
That’s why I distinguished between apathy and indifference. Apathy is an abnormal indifference.
At this point we probably need to find a common definitional basis.
Merriam-Webster:
A-pathy, from pathos (emotion), “without feeling”.
lack of feeling or emotion: impassiveness
lack of interest or concern: indifference
Example: “People have shown a surprising apathy towards these problems.”
Neither does wiktionary imply anything generally abnormal about apathy, their example from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein:
I opened it with apathy; the theory which he attempts to demonstrate and the wonderful facts which he relates soon changed this feeling into enthusiasm.
Notice how apathy is not automatically a descriptor of a universal stance relating to everything, but as in the above examples, can be limited in scope to certain issues. As did I.
If you started out by defining apathy as necessarily “abnormal”, of course it would follow that it is necessarily abnormal, but that would be nothing but circular reasoning. Also, using non-standard definitions should be pointed out lest it cause confusion.
Now to my original comment:
I wouldn’t call relative apathy about status signalling a “deeper problem”, on the contrary, I’d call it a virtue.
How is your “apathetic about food” relevant to “apathetic about status signalling”? My statement was limited to the latter. I’m not extolling the general virtue of apathy, stoicism, or anorexia?
So, Kawoomba, what is your concern here? What’s important about this topic?
Your cognitive resources are limited. So is your lifespan. So are mine. I find it virtuous not to waste either in vast proportions on tribal hierarchy squabbles.
With the rampant obsession about status signalling, dress codes, formulaic conversations, I find it of importance not to call apathy about social status a deeper problem, nor an indicator of one (the original “may be” did not qualify that claim, as I explained).
Calling it a “deeper problem” I’d straight out object. Calling it an indicator of a deeper problem is a skewed perspective if it can also be an indicator for a perceived virtue.
I’m not advocating torn pants here (which in Western civilization are often worn for signalling reasons, alas), but a (to me) more sensible (and productive!) freeing up of some resources by being relatively more apathetic concerning that topic.
I wouldn’t call relative apathy about status signalling a “deeper problem”, on the contrary, I’d call it a virtue. Enough effort is wasted on endless social hierarchy competitions already.
I certainly don’t think status indifference is universally problematic, but was trying to point up the difference between “I’ve figured out that the people in my social circle/the norms I’ve been using are vapid and petty and I’m ready to move on with my life” and “I’m no longer inclined or able to participate in activities I find meaningful.”
The discussion, as I read it, had been about using fashion to attract partners and then giving up on being fashionable. In this case, I posited someone who started dressing fashionably specifically in order to attract partners and quits dressing fashionably when they’ve done so. Maybe they’ve had a revelation of the “my norms are vapid” sort, or maybe they’ve just accomplished their goals.
But thomblake had an implied question about whether anyone would actually leave a partner because the partner looked unfashionable. One possible cause could be that what made them initially attractive were other character traits/personality features that also led them to dress fashionably, in which case the partner might be have good cause for concern (the “no longer able to do activities” situation). P(!traits | !fashion) > P(traits | !fashion). So the other status gains I referred to would increase the estimate of P(traits | !fashion).
One wouldn’t leave a partner for no reason other than unfashionability unless one places such a high value on fashion that no other status gains could make up for its lack. But a partner who suddenly quits caring how they look might send up some red flags. (Absent discussions of updating norms, of course.)
It depends: I wouldn’t call not strongly caring about status as a terminal value a problem, but irrationally underestimating how important status is as an instrumental value for other goals is a problem (the stereotypical failure mode of nerds, and IME that stereotype does have a grain of truth).
Apathy isn’t ever a virtue.
It might indicate that something is irrelevant, but it was only stated that this “may be” an indicator of a “deeper problem,” i.e., various psychological disorders do have apathy, particularly a loss of concern for how one appears to others, as a symptom.
Not even to Stoics?
Why are you telling me what I can or cannot consider a virtue?
Consider any topic you are invested in, the degree of such ranging from “apathetic regarding topic X” to “highly invested regarding topic X”. Relative apathy about a topic translates to a greater degree of indifference regarding that topic / less of a stake in that issue.
Is it so inconceivable for you to be apathetic towards, say, antiquated traditions, and to consider that indifference as a positive trait, as a virtue? Some meditative frameworks strive towards apathy / indifference towards many areas in life, and regard such as virtuous.
You misread the parent comment:
Apathy about reduced status and lesser social awareness were cited as examples (e.g., exempli gratia) of deeper problems. Even if the referent had been indicator, the “may be” would not be involved either way.
Ah, you may consider anything you like about anything. You may, for example, consider anorexia a virtue.
However, if simple indifference is a virtue, then I have a limitless supply of virtue, because I am indifferent to a limitless supply of possible objects.
“Lesser social awareness” is a recognized psychological impairment (it means “lesser than normal,” or “lesser” as in lessened for the individual), perhaps a developmental or affective disorder.
Indifference about status may be something we might laud, under some circumstances, but it can also be an indicator of depression.
Again, the operative conditional is “may be.” The word “apathy” is also important. That’s why I distinguished between apathy and indifference. Apathy is an abnormal indifference. Someone who is apathetic about food is anorexic.
The situation under consideration was someone “giving up on being fashionable.” That implies a change, that the person was concerned about fashion or appearance previously. Obviously, this might be the result of some turning to more important concerns, but, as stated, and with real people, a shift like that can be a symptom of a disorder.
So, Kawoomba, what is your concern here? What’s important about this topic?
Personally, I’m concerned about anyone who would think of apathy as a virtue. Apathy is a psychological condition, it is not “rational.”
Indifference may be rational. One who is apathetic will not even consider issues or investigate possibilities. One who investigates possibilities may decide that they are indifferent among a number of possible choices.
I might even be a fashionista, but on a particular day decide to wear those old torn pants and shirt, even if they are the “wrong color,” and so what? But that’s not apathy, it’s indifference. Apathy isn’t really a choice, it’s a disabling of the mechanisms that make choices and take action.
At least that’s what “apathy” means to me. When I’m apathetic, I don’t want to get up in the morning. It’s all too much trouble. It could mean anything from not enough coffee to girlfriend deficiency anemia.
Or it could be something deeper.
At this point we probably need to find a common definitional basis.
Merriam-Webster:
A-pathy, from pathos (emotion), “without feeling”.
lack of feeling or emotion: impassiveness
lack of interest or concern: indifference
Example: “People have shown a surprising apathy towards these problems.”
Neither does wiktionary imply anything generally abnormal about apathy, their example from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein:
Notice how apathy is not automatically a descriptor of a universal stance relating to everything, but as in the above examples, can be limited in scope to certain issues. As did I.
If you started out by defining apathy as necessarily “abnormal”, of course it would follow that it is necessarily abnormal, but that would be nothing but circular reasoning. Also, using non-standard definitions should be pointed out lest it cause confusion.
Now to my original comment:
How is your “apathetic about food” relevant to “apathetic about status signalling”? My statement was limited to the latter. I’m not extolling the general virtue of apathy, stoicism, or anorexia?
Your cognitive resources are limited. So is your lifespan. So are mine. I find it virtuous not to waste either in vast proportions on tribal hierarchy squabbles.
With the rampant obsession about status signalling, dress codes, formulaic conversations, I find it of importance not to call apathy about social status a deeper problem, nor an indicator of one (the original “may be” did not qualify that claim, as I explained).
Calling it a “deeper problem” I’d straight out object. Calling it an indicator of a deeper problem is a skewed perspective if it can also be an indicator for a perceived virtue.
I’m not advocating torn pants here (which in Western civilization are often worn for signalling reasons, alas), but a (to me) more sensible (and productive!) freeing up of some resources by being relatively more apathetic concerning that topic.