This would be an interesting result, since the Nash equilibrium of fixed length prisoner’s dilemma is defectbot, and defectbots have not had a great rate of success in past tournaments.
Yes. It would depend on concrete implementation and number of players. The numbers needed for defectbots to actually thrive are very big and it would take a long time to converge into Nash, so I was perhaps a bit overconfident with my prediction.
Moreover, simulations I ran using your rules for evolutionary tournament show that one strategy quickly dominates and others go extinct. Defectbot is among strategies which are fastest to go extinct (even in presence of cooperatebot) as it feeds off overaltruist strategies, which in turn fail to compete with tit-for-tat. So I doubt that at least evolutionary tournament will converge into Nash.
I predict that strategy that tit-for-tats 99 turns and defects on 100-th one will win in evolutionary tournament, given that tit-for-tat is also in the population.
What exactly do you have in mind?
I’m envisioning:
A textual interface where people can enter strategies in psuedocode or possibly a programming language that I can sandbox.
A scheduled job to run games along the lines you’ve described above every day? hour?
A page to display the outcome of previous tournaments.
I would expect it collapse into the Nash equilibrium quite soon.
This would be an interesting result, since the Nash equilibrium of fixed length prisoner’s dilemma is defectbot, and defectbots have not had a great rate of success in past tournaments.
Yes. It would depend on concrete implementation and number of players. The numbers needed for defectbots to actually thrive are very big and it would take a long time to converge into Nash, so I was perhaps a bit overconfident with my prediction.
Moreover, simulations I ran using your rules for evolutionary tournament show that one strategy quickly dominates and others go extinct. Defectbot is among strategies which are fastest to go extinct (even in presence of cooperatebot) as it feeds off overaltruist strategies, which in turn fail to compete with tit-for-tat. So I doubt that at least evolutionary tournament will converge into Nash.
I predict that strategy that tit-for-tats 99 turns and defects on 100-th one will win in evolutionary tournament, given that tit-for-tat is also in the population.
ETA: I’ve sent another strategy.