If I’ve understood it correctly, it’s the idea that the way our mind works is severely constrained by our physical form. For example, one of my pet hypotheses is that, since we are bipeds that grow up vertically, we’re conditioned to think that more important things are in a vertically higher position than less important things (our language is littered with such metaphors: superior, inferior, exalted, debased, etc.). It shouldn’t be immediately obvious that things farther from the ground have greater value, but I’ve found it difficult to show to other people that vertical metaphors are metaphors, and that we’d use different ones if our bodies were different.
For example, one of my pet hypotheses is that, since we are bipeds that grow up vertically, we’re conditioned to think that more important things are in a vertically higher position than less important things
Does this matter, though? A question I have about the whole field of embodied cognition.
It keeps a check on our expectations for mutual understanding with alien species. A lot of our idioms and mental habits won’t have any meaning for them, and vice versa. This already happens between human cultures, but it will happen even more with species that don’t share our biologic history. Ultimately, it will compel us to reconsider how much of our thinking is generalizable, and how much is the contingent product of our evolution.
If I’ve understood it correctly, it’s the idea that the way our mind works is severely constrained by our physical form. For example, one of my pet hypotheses is that, since we are bipeds that grow up vertically, we’re conditioned to think that more important things are in a vertically higher position than less important things (our language is littered with such metaphors: superior, inferior, exalted, debased, etc.). It shouldn’t be immediately obvious that things farther from the ground have greater value, but I’ve found it difficult to show to other people that vertical metaphors are metaphors, and that we’d use different ones if our bodies were different.
You might be interested in Metaphors We Live By by Lakoff and Johnson. It explores cognitive metaphors like HAPPY IS UP, HEALTHY IS UP, etc.
Thank you.
Does this matter, though? A question I have about the whole field of embodied cognition.
It keeps a check on our expectations for mutual understanding with alien species. A lot of our idioms and mental habits won’t have any meaning for them, and vice versa. This already happens between human cultures, but it will happen even more with species that don’t share our biologic history. Ultimately, it will compel us to reconsider how much of our thinking is generalizable, and how much is the contingent product of our evolution.