any account of mathematical realism / modal realism which does not try to explain why some universes or observer-moments have greater weight than others
“Try to explain” is too strong a requirement. It’s OK to acknowledge in some contexts “I don’t yet have a good candidate for how this part of the theory works”. I believe you’ve called it “and here a miracle happens” when you describe things you are partially confused about.
E.g.
“God does not play dice with the universe, but I don’t yet have a good hypothesis for how the results of QM come about in a deterministic universe.” (Einstein being correct but not coming up with MWI)
“Consciousness and qualia must have a purely material explanation, but I don’t yet have a good candidate for that explanation.”
“There must be some weight on mathematical objects that causes the anthropic majority of observer-moments to exist inside larger regions of order, but I don’t yet have a good candidate for an origin of such weights.”
Boltzmann theories are falsified not because their proponents fail to fully specify them, but because they strongly make incredibly incorrect predictions. That’s different from this.
P.S. I do have a candidate for a material explanation of human consciousness and qualia, but that’s not the point of this comment.
Agreed. I will revise to “makes it hard to explain”. The actual problem is that some such views seem to present significant barriers to somebody else coming up with an explanation, haven’t even noticed that there’s a problem, etc.
I’ve been getting a lot of downvotes, so I figure I must have made a mistake somewhere, but nobody has explained it yet (well, I’ve received one comment but not one I understood).
I assume you’re too busy and this isn’t important so I’m not actually expecting any response here—either way, cheers! I’m a fan of all your work
Disagreed—I don’t believe that the idea of Boltzmann brains requires theories to explain “why are we observing ourselves to be structured brains” whatsoever.
Short version is this: If both types of brains must exist, then there must be observers of both types. Observers of the minority type haven’t learned anything to update priors on, since it’s guaranteed that they must exist, and there’s no reason to assume P(structured) = K/(K + M) unless you were privy to some sort of random selection system in place that picked you out ahead of you existing.
It’s the exact same assumption that goes into the Doomsday Argument, but it’s an assumption that requires justification. E.g., if you believed that a God exists and He instantiates souls before inserting them into bodies randomly, then the Bayesian math would flow from there and you would indeed believe on a relatively soon Doomsday or that universes must have an explanation for why-aren’t-I-a-Boltzmann-brain-which-was-overwhelmingly-more-likely.
“Try to explain” is too strong a requirement. It’s OK to acknowledge in some contexts “I don’t yet have a good candidate for how this part of the theory works”. I believe you’ve called it “and here a miracle happens” when you describe things you are partially confused about.
E.g.
“God does not play dice with the universe, but I don’t yet have a good hypothesis for how the results of QM come about in a deterministic universe.” (Einstein being correct but not coming up with MWI)
“Consciousness and qualia must have a purely material explanation, but I don’t yet have a good candidate for that explanation.”
“There must be some weight on mathematical objects that causes the anthropic majority of observer-moments to exist inside larger regions of order, but I don’t yet have a good candidate for an origin of such weights.”
Boltzmann theories are falsified not because their proponents fail to fully specify them, but because they strongly make incredibly incorrect predictions. That’s different from this.
P.S. I do have a candidate for a material explanation of human consciousness and qualia, but that’s not the point of this comment.
Agreed. I will revise to “makes it hard to explain”. The actual problem is that some such views seem to present significant barriers to somebody else coming up with an explanation, haven’t even noticed that there’s a problem, etc.
Hey there, I was wondering if you’d be able to formulate why my following counter is wrong?
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cqdDiMe6K6WcMAF2R/boltzmann-brains-like-doomsday-require-no-explaining
I’ve been getting a lot of downvotes, so I figure I must have made a mistake somewhere, but nobody has explained it yet (well, I’ve received one comment but not one I understood).
I assume you’re too busy and this isn’t important so I’m not actually expecting any response here—either way, cheers! I’m a fan of all your work
Disagreed—I don’t believe that the idea of Boltzmann brains requires theories to explain “why are we observing ourselves to be structured brains” whatsoever.
Short version is this: If both types of brains must exist, then there must be observers of both types. Observers of the minority type haven’t learned anything to update priors on, since it’s guaranteed that they must exist, and there’s no reason to assume P(structured) = K/(K + M) unless you were privy to some sort of random selection system in place that picked you out ahead of you existing.
Longer version explanation here: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/cqdDiMe6K6WcMAF2R/boltzmann-brains-like-doomsday-require-no-explaining
It’s the exact same assumption that goes into the Doomsday Argument, but it’s an assumption that requires justification. E.g., if you believed that a God exists and He instantiates souls before inserting them into bodies randomly, then the Bayesian math would flow from there and you would indeed believe on a relatively soon Doomsday or that universes must have an explanation for why-aren’t-I-a-Boltzmann-brain-which-was-overwhelmingly-more-likely.