Instead you could in principle choose to implement a dynamic that concludes “the universe is probably going to soon get bored of being simple, and start being disordered for a while”.
Why don’t you choose to implement that dynamic?
Why, because I don’t expect to see that actually happen to me, of course! In a way that doesn’t depend at all on which anticipation-dynamic I try to implement, even if I could modify my own source code.
Beings that modify their own source code to expect to win the lottery are then promptly surprised by losing the lottery. Beings that modify their preferences to care much more about worlds in which they win the lottery, predominantly see themselves losing the lottery and ending up in the world they cared about less. If you decide to give up on anticipating that your vision stays ordered, it will nonetheless stay quite ordered. The dynamic by which we expect order is not an explanation for that order. “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away.” Even if you were a kind of being that could stop believing in order, it still wouldn’t go away.
Of which I have also said: The art of shepherding is not about using pebbles to control sheep, but letting sheep control pebbles.
Why not unwind our justification loop for expecting order? Why, because at the end of unwinding, we would still see order rather than chaos. You and I both know that’s true. But why is it true? Not the map-why of how do we justify believing it; the territory-why of “How did it end up that way?”
I believe you should be able to make progress by writing out different map-level and territory-level things. Let me try:
0) My prediction: I expect the universe to continue being ordered.
1) In-map explanation for why I came to believe it: I use a simplicity prior to predict my observations and trust my memory.
2) In-territory explanation for why my prediction succeeds: I’m a human (not a BB) in a simple universe.
The problem: I can’t trust my memory and justify the simplicity prior.
3) In-map justification for using the simplicity prior anyway: memory and simplicity aren’t provably reliable, but I don’t care about my life in case they are not reliable.
Potential crux A: (3) doesn’t undermine the fact that I’m correct only because of (2), so changing what I care about doesn’t change the outcome, yet it still counts as a justification of doing (1). If I cared about complex universes, I wouldn’t be justified in doing (1).
4) In-territory justification for using the simplicity prior anyway: I live in a multiverse where memory and simplicity aren’t reliable in every universe, but I don’t care about universes where they are not reliable.
5) Another in-territory justification for using the simplicity prior: God or some power makes the simplicity prior true in the multiverse.
Potential crux B: some will say (4) is not an explanation because I have to explain “how you go from experience 1 in universe 1 to experience 2 in universe 1 instead of experience 2 in universe 2” or something; others will say it’s all anthropic woo and any reasonable (5)-type theory is gonna be untestable by construction (until we die).
6) A deeper in-territory explanations for why my prediction (0) succeeds: “God/power did it” (see 5), “I got lucky once to end up in an ordered universe” (see 4), “all experience histories created by the multiverse exist, therefore this experience history was fated to be experienced anyway” (see 4). Due to crux B, I assume the latter can be disputed. The middle one can be criticized for being too lucky.
Why isn’t 3⁄4 a justification? Because of some philosophy regarding the flow of observer moments (crux B)?
Why, because I don’t expect to see that actually happen to me, of course! In a way that doesn’t depend at all on which anticipation-dynamic I try to implement, even if I could modify my own source code.
Beings that modify their own source code to expect to win the lottery are then promptly surprised by losing the lottery. Beings that modify their preferences to care much more about worlds in which they win the lottery, predominantly see themselves losing the lottery and ending up in the world they cared about less. If you decide to give up on anticipating that your vision stays ordered, it will nonetheless stay quite ordered. The dynamic by which we expect order is not an explanation for that order. “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away.” Even if you were a kind of being that could stop believing in order, it still wouldn’t go away.
Of which I have also said: The art of shepherding is not about using pebbles to control sheep, but letting sheep control pebbles.
Why not unwind our justification loop for expecting order? Why, because at the end of unwinding, we would still see order rather than chaos. You and I both know that’s true. But why is it true? Not the map-why of how do we justify believing it; the territory-why of “How did it end up that way?”
I believe you should be able to make progress by writing out different map-level and territory-level things. Let me try:
0) My prediction: I expect the universe to continue being ordered.
1) In-map explanation for why I came to believe it: I use a simplicity prior to predict my observations and trust my memory.
2) In-territory explanation for why my prediction succeeds: I’m a human (not a BB) in a simple universe.
The problem: I can’t trust my memory and justify the simplicity prior.
3) In-map justification for using the simplicity prior anyway: memory and simplicity aren’t provably reliable, but I don’t care about my life in case they are not reliable.
Potential crux A: (3) doesn’t undermine the fact that I’m correct only because of (2), so changing what I care about doesn’t change the outcome, yet it still counts as a justification of doing (1). If I cared about complex universes, I wouldn’t be justified in doing (1).
4) In-territory justification for using the simplicity prior anyway: I live in a multiverse where memory and simplicity aren’t reliable in every universe, but I don’t care about universes where they are not reliable.
5) Another in-territory justification for using the simplicity prior: God or some power makes the simplicity prior true in the multiverse.
Potential crux B: some will say (4) is not an explanation because I have to explain “how you go from experience 1 in universe 1 to experience 2 in universe 1 instead of experience 2 in universe 2” or something; others will say it’s all anthropic woo and any reasonable (5)-type theory is gonna be untestable by construction (until we die).
6) A deeper in-territory explanations for why my prediction (0) succeeds: “God/power did it” (see 5), “I got lucky once to end up in an ordered universe” (see 4), “all experience histories created by the multiverse exist, therefore this experience history was fated to be experienced anyway” (see 4). Due to crux B, I assume the latter can be disputed. The middle one can be criticized for being too lucky.
Why isn’t 3⁄4 a justification? Because of some philosophy regarding the flow of observer moments (crux B)?