I’m fine with this quote as long as the conclusion is not “So let’s just do science without any philosophy!”
Because usually that just means doing science with unexamined philosophical assumptions while deluding yourself that you’re being objective. This goes badly; e.g., Copenhagen interpretation, neurobabble (“Libet experiment proves you have no free will!”).
You need to make a stronger case. Your neurobabble is the result of trying to do philosophy after science rather than of trying to do science without philosophizing. The Copenhagen interpretation (which is, by the by, still in vogue outside of LessWrong, please stop the groupthink) allowed people to get on with their science instead of getting bogged down in its bewildering philosophical implications. Ignoring philosophy was the right thing to do. So I see both your examples as proofs that we should do science without any philosophy.
The Copenhagen interpretation (which is, by the by, still in vogue outside of LessWrong, please stop the groupthink) allowed people to get on with their science instead of getting bogged down in its bewildering philosophical implications.
This is a perfect example of the crypto-philosophy of “we’re not doing philosophy”. Copenhagen is a philosophical interpretation of QM, which makes metaphysical claims about wavefunctions coming into existence and then collapsing. If anything could be called the aphilosophical approach, it would be the Feynman “shut up and calculate” interpretation of QM, but that leads to problems too.
This is not really about MWI versus Copenhagen—it’s more of a meta-issue. This is about how scientists sleepwalked themselves into a philosophical theory about QM without fully realizing they were doing philosophy at all.
I agree with your main point, but I have a nick-picky side question:
Copenhagen is a philosophical interpretation of QM, which makes metaphysical claims about wavefunctions coming into existence and then collapsing.
In what sense is the Copenhagen interpretation making “metaphysical” claims about wavefunctions coming into existence and then collapsing? My sense was that proponents are making a straightforward physical claim, on par with physical claims make by non-QM atomic theory. Copenhagen has not been empirically proved (or empirically disproved), but that does not make it metaphysical.
In other words, I think you might be using “metaphysical” as a synonym for “nonsensical.”
The CI as such is minimal in its commitments, and is not committed to the existence (or non existence) of a real wave function. You comment seems to reflect EY;s habit of conflating the CI with Objective Reduction.
ETA:
This is about how scientists sleepwalked themselves into a philosophical theory about QM without fully realizing they were doing philosophy at all.
Bohr and Heisenberg were in fact quite self-aware about their philosophical presumptions.
As far as I can tell the Copenhagen Interpretation basically is a shut-up-and-calculate interpretation. It’s an operational theory that is only capable of predicting subjective-ish experimental results, and doesn’t make claims about the “contents of reality”. That is to say, all its predictions are of the form “if I did [EXPERIMENT] I would observe a result according to [DISTRIBUTION]”. Which is somewhat respectable (although what exactly counts as an observation is naturally ill-defined, since the theory doesn’t encompass the observer itself).
The real problem is that having the CI as the majority view sucks people into philosophical positions where you’re not allowed to even wonder what reality is made of, or how these observations are manifested. See: “the EPR experiment proved there’s no such thing as reality, right?”
I think scientists who truly understand the principles of Structures of Scientific Revolutions would be better at noticing changes were needed, helping make the changes, or at least not getting in the way.
Instead, most practicing scientists talk about physical realism in a way that even hardcore reductionists think is naive. And that affects how the general populace treats the scientific results. Which affects how science is treated by the general public.
In short, I think if scientists were more philosophically sophisticated, they would help the public be more sophisticated.
Edit: simplicio makes a more important and slightly similar point.
John McCarthy, adapted a line by T.H. Huxley
I’m fine with this quote as long as the conclusion is not “So let’s just do science without any philosophy!”
Because usually that just means doing science with unexamined philosophical assumptions while deluding yourself that you’re being objective. This goes badly; e.g., Copenhagen interpretation, neurobabble (“Libet experiment proves you have no free will!”).
Your comment, with which I agree, inspired me to post this quote.
You need to make a stronger case. Your neurobabble is the result of trying to do philosophy after science rather than of trying to do science without philosophizing. The Copenhagen interpretation (which is, by the by, still in vogue outside of LessWrong, please stop the groupthink) allowed people to get on with their science instead of getting bogged down in its bewildering philosophical implications. Ignoring philosophy was the right thing to do. So I see both your examples as proofs that we should do science without any philosophy.
This is a perfect example of the crypto-philosophy of “we’re not doing philosophy”. Copenhagen is a philosophical interpretation of QM, which makes metaphysical claims about wavefunctions coming into existence and then collapsing. If anything could be called the aphilosophical approach, it would be the Feynman “shut up and calculate” interpretation of QM, but that leads to problems too.
This is not really about MWI versus Copenhagen—it’s more of a meta-issue. This is about how scientists sleepwalked themselves into a philosophical theory about QM without fully realizing they were doing philosophy at all.
I agree with your main point, but I have a nick-picky side question:
In what sense is the Copenhagen interpretation making “metaphysical” claims about wavefunctions coming into existence and then collapsing? My sense was that proponents are making a straightforward physical claim, on par with physical claims make by non-QM atomic theory. Copenhagen has not been empirically proved (or empirically disproved), but that does not make it metaphysical.
In other words, I think you might be using “metaphysical” as a synonym for “nonsensical.”
The CI as such is minimal in its commitments, and is not committed to the existence (or non existence) of a real wave function. You comment seems to reflect EY;s habit of conflating the CI with Objective Reduction.
ETA:
Bohr and Heisenberg were in fact quite self-aware about their philosophical presumptions.
As far as I can tell the Copenhagen Interpretation basically is a shut-up-and-calculate interpretation. It’s an operational theory that is only capable of predicting subjective-ish experimental results, and doesn’t make claims about the “contents of reality”. That is to say, all its predictions are of the form “if I did [EXPERIMENT] I would observe a result according to [DISTRIBUTION]”. Which is somewhat respectable (although what exactly counts as an observation is naturally ill-defined, since the theory doesn’t encompass the observer itself).
The real problem is that having the CI as the majority view sucks people into philosophical positions where you’re not allowed to even wonder what reality is made of, or how these observations are manifested. See: “the EPR experiment proved there’s no such thing as reality, right?”
I disagree. CI is generously, semi-bad anthropocentric epistemology.
CI specifically mentions two fundamental interactions: DeWitt equation and Collapse.
A “shut up and calculate” inteprentation is the Ensemble one.
I think scientists who truly understand the principles of Structures of Scientific Revolutions would be better at noticing changes were needed, helping make the changes, or at least not getting in the way.
Instead, most practicing scientists talk about physical realism in a way that even hardcore reductionists think is naive. And that affects how the general populace treats the scientific results. Which affects how science is treated by the general public.
In short, I think if scientists were more philosophically sophisticated, they would help the public be more sophisticated.
Edit: simplicio makes a more important and slightly similar point.