The fact that Adam committed a crime is not unfalsifiable, it’s simply unfalsfied. There’s just not enough probability weight for her to change her mind, she even admitted that with evidence strong enough she would otherwise change her mind. Eve is being rational in retaining her current prior in the lack of evidence: it’s not that she is assigning 0 to the probability of Adam being the killer, it’s just that in the face of uncertainty there’s no reason to update. On the other hand I don’t see how you could do this to uphold the belief in God: absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
I am trying to make a situation where a belief is (1) unfalsified, (2) unfalsifiable, and (3) has a lack of evidence. How should I change the story such that all 3 conditions are fulfilled. And in that case, would then Eve be irrational?
In a Bayesian framework, the one and only way to make a belief unfalsifiable is to put its probability at 1. Indeed, since Bayesian update is at the root about logics and not about physics: even if you don’t have any technological mean whatsoever to recover an evidence, and will never have, if it’s logically possible to falsify a theory, then it’s falsifiable. On the other side, once a belief acquires a probability of 1, then it’s set to true in the model and later no amount of evidence can change this status. Unfortunately for your example, it means that unfalsifiability and lack of evidence, even an extreme one, are orthogonal concern.
I understand what you are trying to say, but I am struggling to see if it is true.
It’s a straightforward corollary of Bayes theorem: if P(A) = 1 (or P(A) = 0), no amount of later updating can change this value. No matter what strong contrary evidence is presented. This is indeed a simple model of a hardcore theist: he has already set P(god(s)) to true, so he is willing to dig himself a hole of unlimited depth to account for the evidence that oppose the existence of a divinity.
As for some example, Russel’s teapot is a good choice: a teapot orbiting a distant sun in other galaxy. Is it falsifiable? With our current and future technology, probably not. Is it logically falsifiable: yes! Even if you assign a very low probability to its existence, an alien species could just transport us there and show us that there’s such a teapot. On the other hand, as I mentioned earlier, if we had put P(teapot) = 0, then we will never accept the teapot existence, even in the face of space travelling aliens that show us that the thing is actually there.
Rationality is about how to process evidence to change one’s prior, it has very little to say about what belief you start with, besides the fact that it must be expressible with classical logic. To complicate the matter, Bayesian evidence works in such a way that if you classify something as evidence, then it means that its absence will lower the probability of the assertion it is supporting.
To have a belief that is both rational and unsupported, you must start with a model that is at one time compatible with background information, whose support is difficult to obtain and is a better fit than competing models, who might even have easier to obtain evidence. A tough challenge!
I am trying to make a situation where a belief is (1) unfalsified, (2) unfalsifiable, and (3) has a lack of evidence.
Would Russell’s teapot qualify? If you want to make it unfalsifiable, you you can move it to another galaxy and specify that the statement is true in a narrow time frame, say, for the next five minutes.
Yes exactly! The issue with that is the irrelevance of it. It is of no great import to anyone (except the teapot church, which I think is a bad satire of religion. The amount of suspension of disbelieve the narrative require is beyond me). On the other hand, Adam’s innocence is relevant, meaningful and important to Eve (I hope this is obvious from the narrative).
Moreover, since people are assumed to be innocent until proven guilty, in the eye of many laws, the burden of proof argument from Russell’s teapot is not applicable here.
In this twist of Russell’s teapot, I think it is rational for Eve to maintain her belief. And that her belief is relevant and the burden of proof is not upon her. And by extension, this argument could be used by theist. But I know that my reasoning is not impeccable, so here I am Less Wrong.
The fact that Adam committed a crime is not unfalsifiable, it’s simply unfalsfied. There’s just not enough probability weight for her to change her mind, she even admitted that with evidence strong enough she would otherwise change her mind.
Eve is being rational in retaining her current prior in the lack of evidence: it’s not that she is assigning 0 to the probability of Adam being the killer, it’s just that in the face of uncertainty there’s no reason to update.
On the other hand I don’t see how you could do this to uphold the belief in God: absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
I am trying to make a situation where a belief is (1) unfalsified, (2) unfalsifiable, and (3) has a lack of evidence. How should I change the story such that all 3 conditions are fulfilled. And in that case, would then Eve be irrational?
In a Bayesian framework, the one and only way to make a belief unfalsifiable is to put its probability at 1.
Indeed, since Bayesian update is at the root about logics and not about physics: even if you don’t have any technological mean whatsoever to recover an evidence, and will never have, if it’s logically possible to falsify a theory, then it’s falsifiable.
On the other side, once a belief acquires a probability of 1, then it’s set to true in the model and later no amount of evidence can change this status.
Unfortunately for your example, it means that unfalsifiability and lack of evidence, even an extreme one, are orthogonal concern.
That is a very novel concept for me. I understand what you are trying to say, but I am struggling to see if it is true.
Can you give me few examples where something is “physically unfalsifiable” but “logically falsifiable” and the distinction is of great import?
It’s a straightforward corollary of Bayes theorem: if P(A) = 1 (or P(A) = 0), no amount of later updating can change this value. No matter what strong contrary evidence is presented.
This is indeed a simple model of a hardcore theist: he has already set P(god(s)) to true, so he is willing to dig himself a hole of unlimited depth to account for the evidence that oppose the existence of a divinity.
As for some example, Russel’s teapot is a good choice: a teapot orbiting a distant sun in other galaxy. Is it falsifiable? With our current and future technology, probably not.
Is it logically falsifiable: yes! Even if you assign a very low probability to its existence, an alien species could just transport us there and show us that there’s such a teapot.
On the other hand, as I mentioned earlier, if we had put P(teapot) = 0, then we will never accept the teapot existence, even in the face of space travelling aliens that show us that the thing is actually there.
I see… I have been using unfalsifiability and lack of evidence as a synonym. The title should have read: a rational believe without evidence
Thank You.
That’s a difficult one to achieve.
Rationality is about how to process evidence to change one’s prior, it has very little to say about what belief you start with, besides the fact that it must be expressible with classical logic.
To complicate the matter, Bayesian evidence works in such a way that if you classify something as evidence, then it means that its absence will lower the probability of the assertion it is supporting.
To have a belief that is both rational and unsupported, you must start with a model that is at one time compatible with background information, whose support is difficult to obtain and is a better fit than competing models, who might even have easier to obtain evidence.
A tough challenge!
Would Russell’s teapot qualify? If you want to make it unfalsifiable, you you can move it to another galaxy and specify that the statement is true in a narrow time frame, say, for the next five minutes.
Yes exactly! The issue with that is the irrelevance of it. It is of no great import to anyone (except the teapot church, which I think is a bad satire of religion. The amount of suspension of disbelieve the narrative require is beyond me). On the other hand, Adam’s innocence is relevant, meaningful and important to Eve (I hope this is obvious from the narrative).
Moreover, since people are assumed to be innocent until proven guilty, in the eye of many laws, the burden of proof argument from Russell’s teapot is not applicable here.
In this twist of Russell’s teapot, I think it is rational for Eve to maintain her belief. And that her belief is relevant and the burden of proof is not upon her. And by extension, this argument could be used by theist. But I know that my reasoning is not impeccable, so here I am Less Wrong.