I’m not a vegetarian, it would be quite hypocritical for me to invest resources in saving one bird for “care” reasons and then going to eat a chicken at dinner.
This strikes me as backward reasoning—if your moral intuitions about large numbers of animals dying are broken, isn’t it much more likely that you made a mistake about vegetarianism?
(Also, three dollars isn’t that high a value to place on something. I can definitely believe you get more than $3 worth of utility from eating a chicken. Heck, the chicken probably cost a good bit more than $3.)
It may be more accurate to say something along the lines of “I mind large numbers of animals dying for no good reason. Food is a good reason, and thus do not mind eating chicken. An oil spill is not a good reason.”
Hey, I just wanted to chime in here. I found the moral argument against eating animals compelling for years but lived fairly happily in conflict with my intuitions there. I was literally saying, “I find the moral argument for vegetarianism compelling” while eating a burger, and feeling only slightly awkward doing so.
It is in fact possible (possibly common) for people to ‘reason backward’ from behavior (eat meat) to values (“I don’t mind large groups of animals dying”). I think that particular example CAN be consistent with your moral function (if you really don’t care about non-human animals very much at all) - but by no means is that guaranteed.
This strikes me as backward reasoning—if your moral intuitions about large numbers of animals dying are broken, isn’t it much more likely that you made a mistake about vegetarianism?
(Also, three dollars isn’t that high a value to place on something. I can definitely believe you get more than $3 worth of utility from eating a chicken. Heck, the chicken probably cost a good bit more than $3.)
It may be more accurate to say something along the lines of “I mind large numbers of animals dying for no good reason. Food is a good reason, and thus do not mind eating chicken. An oil spill is not a good reason.”
Hey, I just wanted to chime in here. I found the moral argument against eating animals compelling for years but lived fairly happily in conflict with my intuitions there. I was literally saying, “I find the moral argument for vegetarianism compelling” while eating a burger, and feeling only slightly awkward doing so.
It is in fact possible (possibly common) for people to ‘reason backward’ from behavior (eat meat) to values (“I don’t mind large groups of animals dying”). I think that particular example CAN be consistent with your moral function (if you really don’t care about non-human animals very much at all) - but by no means is that guaranteed.
That’s a good point. Humans are disturbingly good at motivated reasoning and compartmentalization on occasion.
Double-post.