Every example Chapman gives there to illustrate the supposed deficiencies of “the map is not the territory” is of actual maps of actual territories, showing many different ways in which an actual map can fail to correspond to the actual territory, and corresponding situations of metaphorical maps of metaphorical territories. The metaphor passes with flying colours even as Chapman claims to have knocked it down.
To me, the main deficiency is that it doesn’t make the possibility, indeed, the eventual inevitability of ontological remodeling explicit. The map is a definite concept, everybody knows what maps look like, that you can always compare them etc. But you can’t readily compare Newtonian and quantum mechanics, they mostly aren’t even speaking about the same things.
Every example Chapman gives there to illustrate the supposed deficiencies of “the map is not the territory” is of actual maps of actual territories, showing many different ways in which an actual map can fail to correspond to the actual territory, and corresponding situations of metaphorical maps of metaphorical territories. The metaphor passes with flying colours even as Chapman claims to have knocked it down.
To me, the main deficiency is that it doesn’t make the possibility, indeed, the eventual inevitability of ontological remodeling explicit. The map is a definite concept, everybody knows what maps look like, that you can always compare them etc. But you can’t readily compare Newtonian and quantum mechanics, they mostly aren’t even speaking about the same things.
Switching from a flat map drawn on paper (parchment?), to a globe, would be an example of ontological remodeling.