Science google off, Bayes googles back on. If that is the state of affairs in science, then we know MWI is the better one because it is simpler.
The goal of the sequence is to convince us of this position. But if we hypothesize that the difference between the two theories does not pay rent in anticipated experience, then I’m unconvinced that it is rational to say that one theory has higher probability—certainly not to the level of certainty presented in the sequence.
If one wants to argue that research resources are poorly allocated between less complex and more complex hypothesis, have at it. I don’t disagree, but I think re-engineering the practice of scientific research is sociology issue, not a pure right and wrong issue.
Either the scientists are undecided because there’s no evidence, and Occam clear it up as EY says, or the scientists are in some other state and the whole sequence is built on bad premises.
Even granting the assertion that one should assign probability to beliefs that don’t pay rent, it really requires a specialist to determine that MWI is the simpler explanation. Eliezer’s ridicule of the collapse theories could fulfill that function, but my sense is that his talented-layperson perspective leads him astray. Much like the difference between “clear and present danger” and “imminent lawless action” are hard to distinguish unless one has studied the relevant free speech law.
And that’s why quantum mechanics was a poor choice of topic for the case study. Eliezer doesn’t know enough physics to justify his confidence in the relative simplicity of MWI. And fighting that fight is totally distinct from the essential issue I discussed above.
But if we hypothesize that the difference between the two theories does not pay rent in anticipated experience, then I’m unconvinced that it is rational to say that one theory has higher probability.
If I offered two competing theories:
Each electron contains inside it a tiny little angel that is happy when things go well in the world and sad when things go badly. But there’s absolutely no way to detect such from the outside.
Electrons don’t actually contain any entities with minds inside them, even undetectable ones.
I think you’d assign higher probability to the latter theory, even though there’s no difference in anticipated experience between the two of them.
The goal of the sequence is to convince us of this position. But if we hypothesize that the difference between the two theories does not pay rent in anticipated experience, then I’m unconvinced that it is rational to say that one theory has higher probability—certainly not to the level of certainty presented in the sequence.
If one wants to argue that research resources are poorly allocated between less complex and more complex hypothesis, have at it. I don’t disagree, but I think re-engineering the practice of scientific research is sociology issue, not a pure right and wrong issue.
Even granting the assertion that one should assign probability to beliefs that don’t pay rent, it really requires a specialist to determine that MWI is the simpler explanation. Eliezer’s ridicule of the collapse theories could fulfill that function, but my sense is that his talented-layperson perspective leads him astray. Much like the difference between “clear and present danger” and “imminent lawless action” are hard to distinguish unless one has studied the relevant free speech law.
And that’s why quantum mechanics was a poor choice of topic for the case study. Eliezer doesn’t know enough physics to justify his confidence in the relative simplicity of MWI. And fighting that fight is totally distinct from the essential issue I discussed above.
If I offered two competing theories:
Each electron contains inside it a tiny little angel that is happy when things go well in the world and sad when things go badly. But there’s absolutely no way to detect such from the outside.
Electrons don’t actually contain any entities with minds inside them, even undetectable ones.
I think you’d assign higher probability to the latter theory, even though there’s no difference in anticipated experience between the two of them.