I think it’s likely that both of these are factors that contribute to the apparent divergence in human moral reasoning. This seems to be another piece of bad news for the prospect of CEV, unless there are stronger converging influences in human moral reasoning that (in the limit of reflective equilibrium) can counteract these diverging tendencies.
If my morality had changed simply from me hearing about a moral simplification and throwing out what didn’t fit, and I only picked that moral simplification because I had heard of it first and because of it diverged, I would want to discard the simplification and go back to an earlier, more convergent morality.
If my morality had changed simply from me hearing about a moral simplification and throwing out what didn’t fit, and I only picked that moral simplification because I had heard of it first and because of it diverged, I would want to discard the simplification and go back to an earlier, more convergent morality.
Is that a sufficient converging influence?