The basic idea is that there are “primary colours” of our moral intuitions that include fairness, harm reduction, loyalty, purity, respect for authority. These considerations give you a web of intuitions about goodness and propriety that are often brought into conflict. You might have a respect for authority, but also recognise that this can cause grave harm. You might have a respect for purity that gives you a knee jerk aversion to promiscuity or homosexuality, but also see that this is unfair to people who have immutable preferences and who aren’t harming anyone.
There’s no way to reconcile these conflicting intuitions, so we tend to focus on a “prime directive” like “make the world a better place”, or “be a fine upstanding individual in your own life and try not to judge other people too harshly”.
I think the former, “make the world a better place”, is particularly good for producing moral systems that are internally consistent. It does ask you to question and reject a lot of knee jerk reactions. Counter-factuals are useful in doing this. Someone who has trouble letting go of a moral distaste for promiscuity or gluttony should keep in mind that the same instinct could under different circumstances make you repulsed by the idea of a woman on her period preparing food. Someone who thinks there’s a moral failure in refusing to stick together with your in-group under adversity should remember that this instinct could have put you on the wrong side of the Holocaust.
Someone who thinks there’s a moral failure in refusing to stick together with your in-group under adversity should remember that this instinct could have put you on the wrong side of the Holocaust
From a strictly utilitarian standpoint, if one had a strong commitment to the common good, but uncommonly little knee-jerk reaction or natural empathy, would it have made more sense to passively tolerate the Holocaust/offer only safe resistance, and live to affect the post-war world, where there could be more one could do for oneself/humanity?
Or make a stand and give your all to saving as many as possible, feeling plenty of moral gratification, and trying to go out in a blaze of glory when They came for you, which could also make you an inspiring example in, say, half a century?
I used to hold the former completely unacceptable after being strongly influenced by Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism (a great read, highly recommended) and her notion of “Radical evil” (somewhat deontologically loaded), but I have yet to attempt a rationalist evaluation of what I’ve read.
I think the line of research being conducted by Haidt and others on the psychology of morality is relevant here. His TED talk provides a simple summary: http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind.html
The basic idea is that there are “primary colours” of our moral intuitions that include fairness, harm reduction, loyalty, purity, respect for authority. These considerations give you a web of intuitions about goodness and propriety that are often brought into conflict. You might have a respect for authority, but also recognise that this can cause grave harm. You might have a respect for purity that gives you a knee jerk aversion to promiscuity or homosexuality, but also see that this is unfair to people who have immutable preferences and who aren’t harming anyone.
There’s no way to reconcile these conflicting intuitions, so we tend to focus on a “prime directive” like “make the world a better place”, or “be a fine upstanding individual in your own life and try not to judge other people too harshly”.
I think the former, “make the world a better place”, is particularly good for producing moral systems that are internally consistent. It does ask you to question and reject a lot of knee jerk reactions. Counter-factuals are useful in doing this. Someone who has trouble letting go of a moral distaste for promiscuity or gluttony should keep in mind that the same instinct could under different circumstances make you repulsed by the idea of a woman on her period preparing food. Someone who thinks there’s a moral failure in refusing to stick together with your in-group under adversity should remember that this instinct could have put you on the wrong side of the Holocaust.
From a strictly utilitarian standpoint, if one had a strong commitment to the common good, but uncommonly little knee-jerk reaction or natural empathy, would it have made more sense to passively tolerate the Holocaust/offer only safe resistance, and live to affect the post-war world, where there could be more one could do for oneself/humanity?
Or make a stand and give your all to saving as many as possible, feeling plenty of moral gratification, and trying to go out in a blaze of glory when They came for you, which could also make you an inspiring example in, say, half a century?
I used to hold the former completely unacceptable after being strongly influenced by Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism (a great read, highly recommended) and her notion of “Radical evil” (somewhat deontologically loaded), but I have yet to attempt a rationalist evaluation of what I’ve read.