I think we inherit this idea of “lies are worse than secrets” from classic deontological morality (an act-utilitarian could try to quantify the harm caused by each and compare, so he doesn’t have as deep a problem)
In my opinion, a lot of deontological morality is rooted in a system for minimizing blame The guy who wouldn’t push the fat man onto the tracks to save the people in the trolley problem ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem#The_fat_man ) knows that he couldn’t be blamed for the trolley victims’ death, but he could and would be blamed for the murder of the fat man. Therefore, he concludes that leaving the people on the track to die is more moral. Now, looking at your analogy:
“If a man is starving, not giving him a loaf of bread is as deadly as giving him cyanide. But if there are a lot of random objects lying around in the neighborhood, the former deed is less deadly: it’s far more likely that one of the random objects is a loaf of bread than that it is an antidote to cyanide.”
If I give a man cyanide, then I am clearly and visibly to blame for his death. From a status point of view, that’s social suicide. If I fail to give him a loaf of bread, society isn’t going to come knocking down my door to drag me to jail. For one thing, no one will even associate his death with me. For another, everyone else who didn’t give him bread will be equally to blame. Therefore in classical morality, giving him cyanide is an evil act and not giving him bread is a neutral or barely-evil act.
Now apply that to the lies versus secrets question. If I tell a lie, and I’m caught, then people have every right to get mad at me. If I don’t tell you some information that is necessary for you to succeed, you can never prove that I did it intentionally and everyone else who failed to give you that information is equally guilty. Therefore classical morality considers lying worse than keeping secrets, even in cases where utilitarian morality says I’ve harmed you exactly the same amount either way.
If we alter the situation to make it easier to pin the blame on me, classical morality starts condemning me more. If I am the sole witness in an important criminal case and I describe the entire scene accurately except that I fail to mention I saw the suspect there with a knife, and then a videotape later shows me at the scene, staring at the suspect, I will get in trouble. In this case, it’s easy to blame me for not conveying the information, since I was ritually placed in a position where conveying the information was my sole responsibility and since it can be proven I withheld the information intentionally. And in this situation, most people would consider my withholding of information “immoral”.
“If I fail to give him a loaf of bread, society isn’t going to come knocking down my door to drag me to jail.”
Unfortunately this is not entirely correct. Some hold the social principal that “positive rights” would socially demand such actions and in many circles withholding said loaf of bread would be equivocated to cyanide poisoning.
I think we inherit this idea of “lies are worse than secrets” from classic deontological morality (an act-utilitarian could try to quantify the harm caused by each and compare, so he doesn’t have as deep a problem)
In my opinion, a lot of deontological morality is rooted in a system for minimizing blame The guy who wouldn’t push the fat man onto the tracks to save the people in the trolley problem ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem#The_fat_man ) knows that he couldn’t be blamed for the trolley victims’ death, but he could and would be blamed for the murder of the fat man. Therefore, he concludes that leaving the people on the track to die is more moral. Now, looking at your analogy:
“If a man is starving, not giving him a loaf of bread is as deadly as giving him cyanide. But if there are a lot of random objects lying around in the neighborhood, the former deed is less deadly: it’s far more likely that one of the random objects is a loaf of bread than that it is an antidote to cyanide.”
If I give a man cyanide, then I am clearly and visibly to blame for his death. From a status point of view, that’s social suicide. If I fail to give him a loaf of bread, society isn’t going to come knocking down my door to drag me to jail. For one thing, no one will even associate his death with me. For another, everyone else who didn’t give him bread will be equally to blame. Therefore in classical morality, giving him cyanide is an evil act and not giving him bread is a neutral or barely-evil act.
Now apply that to the lies versus secrets question. If I tell a lie, and I’m caught, then people have every right to get mad at me. If I don’t tell you some information that is necessary for you to succeed, you can never prove that I did it intentionally and everyone else who failed to give you that information is equally guilty. Therefore classical morality considers lying worse than keeping secrets, even in cases where utilitarian morality says I’ve harmed you exactly the same amount either way.
If we alter the situation to make it easier to pin the blame on me, classical morality starts condemning me more. If I am the sole witness in an important criminal case and I describe the entire scene accurately except that I fail to mention I saw the suspect there with a knife, and then a videotape later shows me at the scene, staring at the suspect, I will get in trouble. In this case, it’s easy to blame me for not conveying the information, since I was ritually placed in a position where conveying the information was my sole responsibility and since it can be proven I withheld the information intentionally. And in this situation, most people would consider my withholding of information “immoral”.
“If I fail to give him a loaf of bread, society isn’t going to come knocking down my door to drag me to jail.”
Unfortunately this is not entirely correct. Some hold the social principal that “positive rights” would socially demand such actions and in many circles withholding said loaf of bread would be equivocated to cyanide poisoning.