It seems way simpler to leave out the “freely willed decision” part altogether.
If we posit that the Predictor can reliably predict my future choice based on currently available evidence, it follows that my future choice is constrained by the current state of the world. Given that, what remains to be explained?
Yes, I agree with you—but when you tell some people that the question arises of what is in the big-money box after Omega leaves… and the answer is “if you’re considering this, nothing.”
A lot of others (non-LW people) I tell this to say it doesn’t sound right. The bit just shows you that the seeming closed-loop is not actually a closed loop in a very simple and intuitive way** (oh and it actually agrees with ‘there is no free will’), and also it made me think of the whole thing from a new light (maybe other things that look like closed loops can be shown not to be in similar ways).
** Anna Salamon’s cutting argument is very good too but a) it doesn’t make the closed-loop-seeming thing any less closed-loop-seeming and b) it’s hard to understand for most people and I’m guessing it will look like garbage to people who don’t default to compatibilist.
I suppose. When dealing with believers in noncompatibilist free will, I typically just accept that on their view a reliable Predictor is not possible in the first place, and so they have two choices… either refuse to engage with the thought experiment at all, or accept that for purposes of this thought experiment they’ve been demonstrated empirically to be wrong about the possibility of a reliable Predictor (and consequently about their belief in free will).
That said, I can respect someone refusing to engage with a thought experiment at all, if they consider the implications of the thought experiment absurd.
As long as we’re here, I can also respect someone whose answer to “Assume Predictor yadda yadda what do you do?” is “How should I know what I do? I am not a Predictor. I do whatever it is someone like me does in that situation; beats me what that actually is.”
It seems way simpler to leave out the “freely willed decision” part altogether.
If we posit that the Predictor can reliably predict my future choice based on currently available evidence, it follows that my future choice is constrained by the current state of the world. Given that, what remains to be explained?
Yes, I agree with you—but when you tell some people that the question arises of what is in the big-money box after Omega leaves… and the answer is “if you’re considering this, nothing.”
A lot of others (non-LW people) I tell this to say it doesn’t sound right. The bit just shows you that the seeming closed-loop is not actually a closed loop in a very simple and intuitive way** (oh and it actually agrees with ‘there is no free will’), and also it made me think of the whole thing from a new light (maybe other things that look like closed loops can be shown not to be in similar ways).
** Anna Salamon’s cutting argument is very good too but a) it doesn’t make the closed-loop-seeming thing any less closed-loop-seeming and b) it’s hard to understand for most people and I’m guessing it will look like garbage to people who don’t default to compatibilist.
I suppose.
When dealing with believers in noncompatibilist free will, I typically just accept that on their view a reliable Predictor is not possible in the first place, and so they have two choices… either refuse to engage with the thought experiment at all, or accept that for purposes of this thought experiment they’ve been demonstrated empirically to be wrong about the possibility of a reliable Predictor (and consequently about their belief in free will).
That said, I can respect someone refusing to engage with a thought experiment at all, if they consider the implications of the thought experiment absurd.
As long as we’re here, I can also respect someone whose answer to “Assume Predictor yadda yadda what do you do?” is “How should I know what I do? I am not a Predictor. I do whatever it is someone like me does in that situation; beats me what that actually is.”
Error