This is in contrast to consequentialism as a part/tool of other moral systems
If there is a deotological rule don’t murder, then the question becomes, what makes an action murder.
Murder is when you kill someone. (Obviously).
That is, murder is an action with the consequence of death (to rounding)
So there is a sense in which consequentialism is also for saying which actions fall into which categories in some other moral framework.
This might lead to a misreading of consequentialism from moral frameworks that use this sort of consequentialism, where consequentialism is viewed as using the above tool for the categories right and wrong the way that is obvious to them from the consequential argument (the action with the best outcome is good and all else are bad), but it does not lead to the automatic inference of the gap between these categories in consequentialism and other moral theories.
This is in contrast to consequentialism as a part/tool of other moral systems
If there is a deotological rule don’t murder, then the question becomes, what makes an action murder.
Murder is when you kill someone. (Obviously).
That is, murder is an action with the consequence of death (to rounding)
So there is a sense in which consequentialism is also for saying which actions fall into which categories in some other moral framework.
I retract.
“What actions are what” is a question only a consequentialist would ask (consequentialism grows out of the ontology of figuring out the consequences of actions).
Other moral systems can/do exist in ontologies where you do not believe that is possible, or do not trust that it is possible to be good at that, and so judge on other grounds.
This is in contrast to consequentialism as a part/tool of other moral systems
If there is a deotological rule don’t murder, then the question becomes, what makes an action murder.
Murder is when you kill someone. (Obviously).
That is, murder is an action with the consequence of death (to rounding)
So there is a sense in which consequentialism is also for saying which actions fall into which categories in some other moral framework.
This might lead to a misreading of consequentialism from moral frameworks that use this sort of consequentialism, where consequentialism is viewed as using the above tool for the categories right and wrong the way that is obvious to them from the consequential argument (the action with the best outcome is good and all else are bad), but it does not lead to the automatic inference of the gap between these categories in consequentialism and other moral theories.
This doesn’t appear to be what’s usually meant by “consequentialism”?
You are right.
I had an interesting conversation about this.
This is in contrast to consequentialism as a part/tool of other moral systems
If there is a deotological rule don’t murder, then the question becomes, what makes an action murder.
Murder is when you kill someone. (Obviously).
That is, murder is an action with the consequence of death (to rounding)
So there is a sense in which consequentialism is also for saying which actions fall into which categories in some other moral framework.
I retract.
“What actions are what” is a question only a consequentialist would ask (consequentialism grows out of the ontology of figuring out the consequences of actions).
Other moral systems can/do exist in ontologies where you do not believe that is possible, or do not trust that it is possible to be good at that, and so judge on other grounds.