If your decision is determined by an x-risk perspective, it seems to me you only correlate with others whose decision is determined by an x-risk perspective, and logical correlations become irrelevant because their votes decrease net x-risk if and only if yours does (on expectation, after conditioning on the right information). This doesn’t seem to be the common wisdom, so maybe I’m missing something. At least a case for taking logical correlations into account here would have to be more subtle than the more straightforward case for acausal cooperation between egoists.
I think you’re right, for x-risk logical correlation seems irrelevant. So I guess we instead want to know whether voting is good for reducing x-risk assuming that the opportunity cost comes entirely from other x-risk reducing activities, and if not, can a case for voting be made based on both x-risk and other (e.g., selfish) considerations where logical correlation is relevant.
ETA: Ironically, if everyone bought into the CDT argument for not voting based on self interest, much fewer people would vote and it would be a lot easier for people like us to flip elections based on x-risk concerns.
The case would rely on curvature in the sigmoid that describes probability of winning the election as a function of participation. And you’re right, that makes it decidedly a second- or third-order effect; to first order, correlation is irrelevant.
and logical correlations become irrelevant because their votes decrease net x-risk if and only if yours does
I don’t understand this part. What do you mean by “their votes decrease net x-risk if and only if yours does”, and why does that mean logical correlations don’t matter?
And how is this situation different from the general case of voting when some other voters are like-minded?
If your decision is determined by an x-risk perspective, it seems to me you only correlate with others whose decision is determined by an x-risk perspective, and logical correlations become irrelevant because their votes decrease net x-risk if and only if yours does (on expectation, after conditioning on the right information). This doesn’t seem to be the common wisdom, so maybe I’m missing something. At least a case for taking logical correlations into account here would have to be more subtle than the more straightforward case for acausal cooperation between egoists.
I think you’re right, for x-risk logical correlation seems irrelevant. So I guess we instead want to know whether voting is good for reducing x-risk assuming that the opportunity cost comes entirely from other x-risk reducing activities, and if not, can a case for voting be made based on both x-risk and other (e.g., selfish) considerations where logical correlation is relevant.
ETA: Ironically, if everyone bought into the CDT argument for not voting based on self interest, much fewer people would vote and it would be a lot easier for people like us to flip elections based on x-risk concerns.
The case would rely on curvature in the sigmoid that describes probability of winning the election as a function of participation. And you’re right, that makes it decidedly a second- or third-order effect; to first order, correlation is irrelevant.
I don’t understand this part. What do you mean by “their votes decrease net x-risk if and only if yours does”, and why does that mean logical correlations don’t matter?
And how is this situation different from the general case of voting when some other voters are like-minded?