Ok. My guess is that Pearl would say something more like that we have an innate ability to represent causal models, and only after that follow with what you said. He thinks that having the causal model representation is necessary, that you can’t just look at trials and decisions to make causal inferences, if you don’t have this special causal machinery inside you. (Personally, I disagree this is a good frame.)
It’s a loose guess at what Pearl’s opinion is. I’m not sure this boundary exists at all.
Ok. My guess is that Pearl would say something more like that we have an innate ability to represent causal models, and only after that follow with what you said. He thinks that having the causal model representation is necessary, that you can’t just look at trials and decisions to make causal inferences, if you don’t have this special causal machinery inside you. (Personally, I disagree this is a good frame.)