I do think SIA and SSA are making extraordinary claims and the burden of proof is on them. I have proposed assuming the self as a random sample is wrong for several years. That is not the problem I have with this argument. What I disagree with is that your argument depends on phrases and concepts such as “‘your’ existence” and “who ‘you’ are” without even attempting to define what/which one is this ‘you’ refers to. My position is it refers to the self, based on the first-person perspective, which is fundamental, a primitive concept. So it doesn’t require any definition as long as reasoned from the perspective of an experiment subject. But your argument holds the position that perspective is not fundamental. So treating ‘you’, which is the first-person ‘I’ to the reader, as primitive is not possible. Then how do you define this critical concept? And why is your definition better than SIA or SSA’s? You also have a burden of proof. Because without a clear definition, your argument’s conclusion can jump back and forth in limbo. This is illustrated by the example of the modified BJE above. You said:
If it was just two people created the first always with a blue jacket and the second always without and, once again, you were not necessary meant to be the first, then this counts as random sampling and BJE analysis stands.
Isn’t this treating you as a random sample when there is no actual sampling process, i.e. the position you are arguing against?
And how is this experiment different from your FBJE? In other words, which process enables FBJE to guarantee that ‘you’ will be the person in the blue jacket regardless of the coin toss? How come there is no way that you be the person whose jacket depends on the toss? Some fundamental stipulation about what ‘you’ would be is used here.
BTW the FBJE is not comparable to the sleeping beauty problem. In FBJE, by stipulation, you can outright say your blue jacket is not due to the coin landed Tails. But beauty can’t outright say this is Monday.
What I disagree with is that your argument depends on phrases and concepts such as “‘your’ existence” and “who ‘you’ are” without even attempting to define what/which one is this ‘you’ refers to.
The thing is, what “you” refers to, fully depends on the setting of the experiment which is, whether there is random sampling going on or not. In FBJE you are a person in a blue jacket, regardless of the coin toss outcome. In BJE you are one of the created people and can either have a blue jacket or not with probabilities depending on the coin toss. Part of the confusion of anthropics is thinking that “you” always points to the same thing in any experiment setting and what I’m trying to show is that it is not the case. And this approach is clearly superrior to both SSA and SIA, which claim that it has to always be one particular way biting all the ridiculous bullets and presumptious cases on the way.
My position is it refers to the self, based on the first-person perspective, which is fundamental, a primitive concept.
Is it true, though? I agree it’s easy to just accept as an axiom that “selfness” is some fundamental property and try to build your ontological theory on this assumption. But the more we learn more about the ordered mechanism of the universe, the less probable subjective idealism becomes, compared to materialism.
I believe, on our current level of knowledge, it doesn’t really seem plausiable that “first person perspective” is somehow fundamental. In the end it’s made from quarks like everything else.
Isn’t this treating you as a random sample when there is no actual sampling process, i.e. the position you are arguing against?
No this is treating you as a random sample when you are actually random sampled. I was comming from the assumption that people have good intuitive understanding what counts as random sample and what doesn’t. But I see why this may be confusing in its own right, and I make a note for myself to go deeper into the question in one of future posts. For now I’ll just point that a regular coin toss counts as a random sample between two outcomes, even if it was made a year ago. Same logic applies here.
In other words, which process enables FBJE to guarantee that ‘you’ will be the person in the blue jacket regardless of the coin toss? How come there is no way that you be the person whose jacket depends on the toss?
Well, I can come up with some plausible sounding settings, but this doesn’t really matter for the general point I’m making. Whatever is the priocess that is guaranteeing that you in particular will always have the blue jacket the logic stays the same. And if there is no such process—then we have a different logic. So the question about anthropic probabilities reduces to the question about the causal structure of the experiment and basic probability theory.
BTW the FBJE is not comparable to the sleeping beauty problem. In FBJE, by stipulation, you can outright say your blue jacket is not due to the coin landed Tails. But beauty can’t outright say this is Monday.
I didn’t say that she necessary can. I said that if she can, then we have the same setting as with FBJE. Learning that you are awaken on Monday in SB leads to the same update (which is no update at all) as learning that you wear a Blue Jacket because both outcomes were meant to happen regardless of the coin toss outcome.
I do think SIA and SSA are making extraordinary claims and the burden of proof is on them. I have proposed assuming the self as a random sample is wrong for several years. That is not the problem I have with this argument. What I disagree with is that your argument depends on phrases and concepts such as “‘your’ existence” and “who ‘you’ are” without even attempting to define what/which one is this ‘you’ refers to. My position is it refers to the self, based on the first-person perspective, which is fundamental, a primitive concept. So it doesn’t require any definition as long as reasoned from the perspective of an experiment subject. But your argument holds the position that perspective is not fundamental. So treating ‘you’, which is the first-person ‘I’ to the reader, as primitive is not possible. Then how do you define this critical concept? And why is your definition better than SIA or SSA’s? You also have a burden of proof. Because without a clear definition, your argument’s conclusion can jump back and forth in limbo. This is illustrated by the example of the modified BJE above. You said:
Isn’t this treating you as a random sample when there is no actual sampling process, i.e. the position you are arguing against?
And how is this experiment different from your FBJE? In other words, which process enables FBJE to guarantee that ‘you’ will be the person in the blue jacket regardless of the coin toss? How come there is no way that you be the person whose jacket depends on the toss? Some fundamental stipulation about what ‘you’ would be is used here.
BTW the FBJE is not comparable to the sleeping beauty problem. In FBJE, by stipulation, you can outright say your blue jacket is not due to the coin landed Tails. But beauty can’t outright say this is Monday.
The thing is, what “you” refers to, fully depends on the setting of the experiment which is, whether there is random sampling going on or not. In FBJE you are a person in a blue jacket, regardless of the coin toss outcome. In BJE you are one of the created people and can either have a blue jacket or not with probabilities depending on the coin toss. Part of the confusion of anthropics is thinking that “you” always points to the same thing in any experiment setting and what I’m trying to show is that it is not the case. And this approach is clearly superrior to both SSA and SIA, which claim that it has to always be one particular way biting all the ridiculous bullets and presumptious cases on the way.
Is it true, though? I agree it’s easy to just accept as an axiom that “selfness” is some fundamental property and try to build your ontological theory on this assumption. But the more we learn more about the ordered mechanism of the universe, the less probable subjective idealism becomes, compared to materialism.
I believe, on our current level of knowledge, it doesn’t really seem plausiable that “first person perspective” is somehow fundamental. In the end it’s made from quarks like everything else.
No this is treating you as a random sample when you are actually random sampled. I was comming from the assumption that people have good intuitive understanding what counts as random sample and what doesn’t. But I see why this may be confusing in its own right, and I make a note for myself to go deeper into the question in one of future posts. For now I’ll just point that a regular coin toss counts as a random sample between two outcomes, even if it was made a year ago. Same logic applies here.
Well, I can come up with some plausible sounding settings, but this doesn’t really matter for the general point I’m making. Whatever is the priocess that is guaranteeing that you in particular will always have the blue jacket the logic stays the same. And if there is no such process—then we have a different logic. So the question about anthropic probabilities reduces to the question about the causal structure of the experiment and basic probability theory.
I didn’t say that she necessary can. I said that if she can, then we have the same setting as with FBJE. Learning that you are awaken on Monday in SB leads to the same update (which is no update at all) as learning that you wear a Blue Jacket because both outcomes were meant to happen regardless of the coin toss outcome.