There is a reasonable good chance that when averaged out by the currently unspecified method used by the CEV process that any abominable volitions are offset by volitions that are at least vaguely acceptable. But that doesn’t mean including Jerks (where ‘Jerk’ is defined as agents whose extrapolated volitions are deprecated) in the process that determines the fate of the universe is The Right Thing To Do any more than including paperclippers, superhappies and babyeaters in the process is obviously The Right Thing To Do.
CEV might turn out OK. Given the choice of setting loose a {Superintelligence Optimising CEV} or {Nothing At All nothing at all and we all go extinct} I’ll choose the former. There are also obvious political reasons why such a compromise might be necessary.
If anyone thinks that CEV is not a worse thing to set loose than CEV then they are not being altruistic or moral they are being confused about a matter of fact.
Disclaimer that is becoming almost mandatory in this kind of discussion: altruism, ethics and morality belong inside utility functions and volitions not in game theory or abstract optimisation processes.
But that doesn’t mean including Jerks (where ‘Jerk’ is defined as agents whose extrapolated volitions are deprecated) in the process that determines the fate of the universe is The Right Thing To Do
Sure, inclusion is a thing that causes good and bad outcomes, and not necessarily net good outcomes.
There are also obvious political reasons why such a compromise might be necessary.
Sure, but it’s not logically necessary that it’s a compromise, though it might be. It might be that the good outweighs the bad, or not, I’m not sure from where I stand.
If anyone thinks that CEV is not a worse thing to set loose than CEV then they are not being altruistic or moral they are being confused about a matter of fact.
Because I value inclusiveness more than zero, that’s not necessarily true. It’s probably true, or better yet, if one includes the best of the obvious Jerks with the rest of humanity, it’s quite probably true. All else equal, I’d rather an individual be in than out, so if someone is all else equal worse than useless but only light ballast, having them is a net good.
I think your distinction is artificial, can you use it to show how an example question is a wrong question and another isn’t, and show how your distinction sorts among those two types well?
Your Adam and and Eve reply made absolutely no sense and this question makes only slightly more. I cannot relate what you are saying to the disclaimer that you partially quote (except one way that implies you don’t understand the subject matter—which I prefer not to assume). I cannot answer a question about what I am saying when I cannot see how on earth it is relevant.
There is a reasonable good chance that when averaged out by the currently unspecified method used by the CEV process that any abominable volitions are offset by volitions that are at least vaguely acceptable. But that doesn’t mean including Jerks (where ‘Jerk’ is defined as agents whose extrapolated volitions are deprecated) in the process that determines the fate of the universe is The Right Thing To Do any more than including paperclippers, superhappies and babyeaters in the process is obviously The Right Thing To Do.
CEV might turn out OK. Given the choice of setting loose a {Superintelligence Optimising CEV} or {Nothing At All nothing at all and we all go extinct} I’ll choose the former. There are also obvious political reasons why such a compromise might be necessary.
If anyone thinks that CEV is not a worse thing to set loose than CEV then they are not being altruistic or moral they are being confused about a matter of fact.
Disclaimer that is becoming almost mandatory in this kind of discussion: altruism, ethics and morality belong inside utility functions and volitions not in game theory or abstract optimisation processes.
Sure, inclusion is a thing that causes good and bad outcomes, and not necessarily net good outcomes.
Sure, but it’s not logically necessary that it’s a compromise, though it might be. It might be that the good outweighs the bad, or not, I’m not sure from where I stand.
Because I value inclusiveness more than zero, that’s not necessarily true. It’s probably true, or better yet, if one includes the best of the obvious Jerks with the rest of humanity, it’s quite probably true. All else equal, I’d rather an individual be in than out, so if someone is all else equal worse than useless but only light ballast, having them is a net good.
It’s Adam and Eve, not Adam and Vilfredo Pareto!
Huh? Chewbacca?
I think your distinction is artificial, can you use it to show how an example question is a wrong question and another isn’t, and show how your distinction sorts among those two types well?
Your Adam and and Eve reply made absolutely no sense and this question makes only slightly more. I cannot relate what you are saying to the disclaimer that you partially quote (except one way that implies you don’t understand the subject matter—which I prefer not to assume). I cannot answer a question about what I am saying when I cannot see how on earth it is relevant.