Third parties serve as kingmakers in parliamentary systems when no party has a majority, and in return get concessions for priorities that neither the left nor the right parties care about.
In theory, that’s the idea, but that’s also the idea behind third parties in FPTP. The Ulbricht pardon, for example, was promised and acted upon to mitigate the impact of a libertarian spoiler. Likewise a lot of things that the GOP was forced to adopt to avoid being flanked by the Libertarian party, such as some substantial pushback on neoconservative foreign policy[1].
I’ll grant that left-leaning third parties in America have had considerably less success on this front, but I think this is primarily due to an unwillingness to play hardball. There is an understanding that Trump primary voters would’ve been happy to punish the Republican Party establishment severely if they had taken the same measures to suppress their candidate as the Democratic Party’s establishment had taken to suppress Bernie Sanders. However, upwards of 90 percent of Sanders primary voters capitulated and voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 general, even though it was ultimately fruitless for them to do so.
In the opposite direction, as mentioned above, we see considerable electoral success for nationalist parties in Europe, but any policy gains they’ve seen have come from either capturing an outright majority or from other parties fearing a “quasi-spoiler” effect from losing seats to a nationalist party that they are, for one reason or another, not permitted to form a majority with. The intended behavior of the system, in which strong third parties can extract policy concessions by acting as kingmakers, has not occurred.
As best I can tell, it is the respective personalities of establishment and populist leadership that determine the effectiveness of third parties, rather than the system in which they operate.
The Obama policy of trying to avoid ground troop deployments in favor of drones and indirect measures was, if anything, followed even more closely by the Trump administration—the Afghanistan surge, for instance, in which 30,000 additional troops were deployed into Afghanistan in a single burst, has no counterpart in either of his terms, and the Bush policy of major foreign occupations is completely gone, with every candidate that tried to promote it being considered unelectable. A 2% Libertarian defection rate is enough to sink them, and the party at large knows it.
even though it was ultimately fruitless for them to [vote for Clinton]
As of Election Day 2016, there looked like a significant chance that Clinton would win, but by a margin substantially smaller than the size of the Sanders contingent. In the nearby Everett branch where this happened, would you have said that the Sanders voters made a wise or unwise choice?
You might want to pick another example; the assertion “ground troop deployments are politically infeasible” is looking more dubious this year than before.
I’m saying that major deployments might well happen in 2026, not that they already have.
Most obviously, he’s already sent a small number of troops into Venezuela for a mission, plus he’s literally said that he wants the US to be in charge of Venezuela (his Administration walked it back, but he himself still seems happy with the thought). There are plausible things that could happen that would lead him to send in a significant number of soldiers.
Secondly, he allegedly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up an invasion plan for Greenland. Which would certainly cause a surrender rather than a fight, but a non-dangerous mass deployment would still be a mass deployment.
Crucially, he’s not paying any domestic political price for talking as if he wants to deploy troops in either country, which contradicts your assertion already even without those events (yet) happening. The GOP in Congress once again chickened out of taking any action to constrain him, when they saw that his base wasn’t bothered by it at all.
Add to that his saber-rattling against Cuba, and the possibility that something big happens in Gaza or Iran and he feels like it’s an opportunity.
I’m not claiming a major deployment is over 50% likely, but I’d say it’s over 5%, which is enough that I think your footnote is wrong.
Third parties serve as kingmakers in parliamentary systems when no party has a majority, and in return get concessions for priorities that neither the left nor the right parties care about.
In theory, that’s the idea, but that’s also the idea behind third parties in FPTP. The Ulbricht pardon, for example, was promised and acted upon to mitigate the impact of a libertarian spoiler. Likewise a lot of things that the GOP was forced to adopt to avoid being flanked by the Libertarian party, such as some substantial pushback on neoconservative foreign policy[1].
I’ll grant that left-leaning third parties in America have had considerably less success on this front, but I think this is primarily due to an unwillingness to play hardball. There is an understanding that Trump primary voters would’ve been happy to punish the Republican Party establishment severely if they had taken the same measures to suppress their candidate as the Democratic Party’s establishment had taken to suppress Bernie Sanders. However, upwards of 90 percent of Sanders primary voters capitulated and voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 general, even though it was ultimately fruitless for them to do so.
In the opposite direction, as mentioned above, we see considerable electoral success for nationalist parties in Europe, but any policy gains they’ve seen have come from either capturing an outright majority or from other parties fearing a “quasi-spoiler” effect from losing seats to a nationalist party that they are, for one reason or another, not permitted to form a majority with. The intended behavior of the system, in which strong third parties can extract policy concessions by acting as kingmakers, has not occurred.
As best I can tell, it is the respective personalities of establishment and populist leadership that determine the effectiveness of third parties, rather than the system in which they operate.
The Obama policy of trying to avoid ground troop deployments in favor of drones and indirect measures was, if anything, followed even more closely by the Trump administration—the Afghanistan surge, for instance, in which 30,000 additional troops were deployed into Afghanistan in a single burst, has no counterpart in either of his terms, and the Bush policy of major foreign occupations is completely gone, with every candidate that tried to promote it being considered unelectable. A 2% Libertarian defection rate is enough to sink them, and the party at large knows it.
As of Election Day 2016, there looked like a significant chance that Clinton would win, but by a margin substantially smaller than the size of the Sanders contingent. In the nearby Everett branch where this happened, would you have said that the Sanders voters made a wise or unwise choice?
You might want to pick another example; the assertion “ground troop deployments are politically infeasible” is looking more dubious this year than before.
What deployment are you referring to?
I’m saying that major deployments might well happen in 2026, not that they already have.
Most obviously, he’s already sent a small number of troops into Venezuela for a mission, plus he’s literally said that he wants the US to be in charge of Venezuela (his Administration walked it back, but he himself still seems happy with the thought). There are plausible things that could happen that would lead him to send in a significant number of soldiers.
Secondly, he allegedly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up an invasion plan for Greenland. Which would certainly cause a surrender rather than a fight, but a non-dangerous mass deployment would still be a mass deployment.
Crucially, he’s not paying any domestic political price for talking as if he wants to deploy troops in either country, which contradicts your assertion already even without those events (yet) happening. The GOP in Congress once again chickened out of taking any action to constrain him, when they saw that his base wasn’t bothered by it at all.
Add to that his saber-rattling against Cuba, and the possibility that something big happens in Gaza or Iran and he feels like it’s an opportunity.
I’m not claiming a major deployment is over 50% likely, but I’d say it’s over 5%, which is enough that I think your footnote is wrong.