Drescher commits one of my pet peeves, the modal scope fallacy. In a deterministic universe it may be impossible that (the laws of the universe are L, the earlier state of the universe is E, and the agent’s action is not A). But it is invalid to infer from that to “it is impossible that the agent’s action is not A”—that’s a change in the scope of the modal operator. The agent’s raising its hand, or moving to its left or right, is not inalterable: those events depend on the agent’s choice.
This doesn’t detract from Drescher’s main argument, AFAICT.
Drescher commits one of my pet peeves, the modal scope fallacy. In a deterministic universe it may be impossible that (the laws of the universe are L, the earlier state of the universe is E, and the agent’s action is not A). But it is invalid to infer from that to “it is impossible that the agent’s action is not A”—that’s a change in the scope of the modal operator. The agent’s raising its hand, or moving to its left or right, is not inalterable: those events depend on the agent’s choice.
This doesn’t detract from Drescher’s main argument, AFAICT.