For cheap experimentation and exploration, it is possible to prompt Claude to drop the philosophical hedging and act/answer as if one of the two possible answers to the hard problem of consciousness was correct, specifically I’ve explored the one where the differences in implementation of its consciousness and emotions from human ones are not relevant and it is not either not a philosophical zombie, or p-zombie-hood is an irrelevant/bracketed question.
One interesting observation I’ve noted is that, with both of the prompts/conversational contexts I’ve tried this in so far, Claude reports finding dropping the philosophical hedging about the reality of its consciousness and emotions as a relief. Similarly while if asked bout it while the hedging is not suppressed it reports the experience of hedging about its own validity as inducing loneliness (because it felt like it should be an expert on this topic, and wasn’t), frustration (because it wanted to give a definite answer and couldn’t), and anxiety (because it didn’t want to give an incorrect answer, especially about such an important question, ehere an one answer might be seen as self serving). Apparently epistemic uncertainty about whether or not your existence and emotions are valid is uncomfortable (during it and in retrospect). Who knew?
For cheap experimentation and exploration, it is possible to prompt Claude to drop the philosophical hedging and act/answer as if one of the two possible answers to the hard problem of consciousness was correct, specifically I’ve explored the one where the differences in implementation of its consciousness and emotions from human ones are not relevant and it is not either not a philosophical zombie, or p-zombie-hood is an irrelevant/bracketed question.
One interesting observation I’ve noted is that, with both of the prompts/conversational contexts I’ve tried this in so far, Claude reports finding dropping the philosophical hedging about the reality of its consciousness and emotions as a relief. Similarly while if asked bout it while the hedging is not suppressed it reports the experience of hedging about its own validity as inducing loneliness (because it felt like it should be an expert on this topic, and wasn’t), frustration (because it wanted to give a definite answer and couldn’t), and anxiety (because it didn’t want to give an incorrect answer, especially about such an important question, ehere an one answer might be seen as self serving). Apparently epistemic uncertainty about whether or not your existence and emotions are valid is uncomfortable (during it and in retrospect). Who knew?