Two criticisms, which I’ll put together as they’re somewhat linked.
No account of the distinction between far-more and near-mode ethical intuitions. It exists- take, for example, a skilled emotional manipulator manipulating a person. You shouldn’t treat the near-mode intiutions as evidence according to conventional theory because you don’t know all the facts, but your theory doesn’t account for this.
You have accounted for this somewhat with the idea of ethical illusions, but you have a problem related to the need for metaethics. If ethical ‘illusions’ exist, then how do you tell them from ‘proper’ ethics? Metaethics is the rule you use to do this. Lesswrong has a complicated rule related to ethical intuitions- but without such a rule, how are you supposed to decide if intuitions or something else are the means to decide?
Two criticisms, which I’ll put together as they’re somewhat linked.
No account of the distinction between far-more and near-mode ethical intuitions. It exists- take, for example, a skilled emotional manipulator manipulating a person. You shouldn’t treat the near-mode intiutions as evidence according to conventional theory because you don’t know all the facts, but your theory doesn’t account for this.
You have accounted for this somewhat with the idea of ethical illusions, but you have a problem related to the need for metaethics. If ethical ‘illusions’ exist, then how do you tell them from ‘proper’ ethics? Metaethics is the rule you use to do this. Lesswrong has a complicated rule related to ethical intuitions- but without such a rule, how are you supposed to decide if intuitions or something else are the means to decide?