These reactions are for ethics what measurements of time and distance are for physics—the evidence.
This may be somewhat controversial. One has to keep in mind that ethical theories aren’t necessarily theories about human intuitions. (Indeed, to assume otherwise would seem to take for granted a particular theory, such as emotivism.) So this raises the question of what other sorts of evidence there are for ethical propositions, that could prove intuitions wrong.
ETA: Also, the question of privileging the hypothesis is interesting here, because it poses a challenge to the idea of relying on intuitions. After all, if you want to prove a particular ethical thesis, it usually isn’t too hard to come up with some exotic thought-experiment wherein intuition appears to support the desired conclusion. What isn’t so clear is how much weight the intuition gleaned from a particular imaginary scenario should be given.
Thats a really good point. We (or maybe just I) might be conflating two questions: “Is ethics just about our intuitions?” and “Are our intuitions the only way to collect evidence about ethics?”. One place I’m going with this is that I don’t think there is ultimately a difference between these questions, but I certainly didn’t make that case here. I’m really just trying to make the latter point. Can anyone think of any other sorts of evidence?
It also seems like even if there is another way of gathering evidence about morality that contradicts our intuitions it still has to explain the contradictory intuitions since part of the question of ethics is “what is going on with these intuitions?”. For example, Kant gets his morality by examining the form of practical reason but even if that were a valid means of collecting evidence his theory would still need to account for contrary intuitions.
I can imagine one camp arguing for a theory based on nothing but actual observed behavior. Look at field cases (or controlled experiments) where subjects had an ethical choice, and see what they do.
I think I would begin with animals—what kinds and stages of ethics do they have?
The thing is we often say of a person’s actions that they are ethical or unethical. The fact that someone did something doesn’t always tell us a lot about whether or not that thing is moral. Many people feel like they act unethically.
Put another way: Ted Bundy made some ethical choices.
Also, setting up controlled experiments is difficult if you’re worried about being ethical.
I see, so ‘ethics’ can’t be observed directly by behavior.
Whenever you have a choice of action, we label some possible actions ‘ethical’ and some ‘unethical’. We might have a preference for ethical behavior, but it is not the single deciding factor, which is why we can’t look at our choices to determine ethics.
So describing ethics is trying to describe why some actions are labeled ‘ethical’ and you do this by observing which actions you internally label ethical and which you don’t. (Sounds perfect for armchair theorizing to me, because all you’ve got to do is interrogate your intuition… )
Perhaps ‘ethics’ is still behavior, but behavior that occurs before the action. What do you think about using MRI patterning to identify particular forms of guilt, anxiety, etc? Would this come closer to “observing ethics” or still somehow would be measuring something different?
So I read that Alonzo Fyfe thinks this is measuring something different, but I guess he is not defining ethics as what you or I internally label ethical. He calls this ‘beliefs and other attitudes on morality’. (Is there any kind of evidence possible for his view of ethics?)
What do you think about using MRI patterning to identify particular forms of guilt, anxiety, etc?
That might work. There might also be parts of the brain that are used for ethical decisions, so that you can look at the output from an fMRI scan and see if the person made an ethical decision or not, without knowing what the issue was.
This may be somewhat controversial. One has to keep in mind that ethical theories aren’t necessarily theories about human intuitions. (Indeed, to assume otherwise would seem to take for granted a particular theory, such as emotivism.) So this raises the question of what other sorts of evidence there are for ethical propositions, that could prove intuitions wrong.
ETA: Also, the question of privileging the hypothesis is interesting here, because it poses a challenge to the idea of relying on intuitions. After all, if you want to prove a particular ethical thesis, it usually isn’t too hard to come up with some exotic thought-experiment wherein intuition appears to support the desired conclusion. What isn’t so clear is how much weight the intuition gleaned from a particular imaginary scenario should be given.
Thats a really good point. We (or maybe just I) might be conflating two questions: “Is ethics just about our intuitions?” and “Are our intuitions the only way to collect evidence about ethics?”. One place I’m going with this is that I don’t think there is ultimately a difference between these questions, but I certainly didn’t make that case here. I’m really just trying to make the latter point. Can anyone think of any other sorts of evidence?
It also seems like even if there is another way of gathering evidence about morality that contradicts our intuitions it still has to explain the contradictory intuitions since part of the question of ethics is “what is going on with these intuitions?”. For example, Kant gets his morality by examining the form of practical reason but even if that were a valid means of collecting evidence his theory would still need to account for contrary intuitions.
I can imagine one camp arguing for a theory based on nothing but actual observed behavior. Look at field cases (or controlled experiments) where subjects had an ethical choice, and see what they do.
I think I would begin with animals—what kinds and stages of ethics do they have?
The thing is we often say of a person’s actions that they are ethical or unethical. The fact that someone did something doesn’t always tell us a lot about whether or not that thing is moral. Many people feel like they act unethically.
Put another way: Ted Bundy made some ethical choices.
Also, setting up controlled experiments is difficult if you’re worried about being ethical.
I see, so ‘ethics’ can’t be observed directly by behavior.
Whenever you have a choice of action, we label some possible actions ‘ethical’ and some ‘unethical’. We might have a preference for ethical behavior, but it is not the single deciding factor, which is why we can’t look at our choices to determine ethics.
So describing ethics is trying to describe why some actions are labeled ‘ethical’ and you do this by observing which actions you internally label ethical and which you don’t. (Sounds perfect for armchair theorizing to me, because all you’ve got to do is interrogate your intuition… )
Perhaps ‘ethics’ is still behavior, but behavior that occurs before the action. What do you think about using MRI patterning to identify particular forms of guilt, anxiety, etc? Would this come closer to “observing ethics” or still somehow would be measuring something different?
So I read that Alonzo Fyfe thinks this is measuring something different, but I guess he is not defining ethics as what you or I internally label ethical. He calls this ‘beliefs and other attitudes on morality’. (Is there any kind of evidence possible for his view of ethics?)
That might work. There might also be parts of the brain that are used for ethical decisions, so that you can look at the output from an fMRI scan and see if the person made an ethical decision or not, without knowing what the issue was.