the best technical understanding of practical epistemology available at the time* -- the Bayesian account --
Note: I don’t stand by all possible interpretations of this sentence. It should be hedged very carefully, but attempting to do so in the main text would have reduced clarity.
Bayesianism is not a theory of epistemology in the philosophical sense. It has no account of what knowledge is, and as a result, does not attempt to answer many of the questions which are primary concerns of the field. Instead, Bayesianism provides an account of what’s important: the information-theoretic processes which are going on in agents when developing true(er) beliefs, and the relationship between these information-theoretic processes and action. I therefore hedge with “practical epistemology”.
This, too, is not obviously not false, because Bayesianism is in many respects far from practical. While our community focuses on a praxis developed around the Bayesian model, it is not really clear that it is “the best” for this purpose: one might do better with techniques derived more from practice. There are schools of thought one might point to in this respect, such as whatever it is they teach in critical thinking courses these days, or ideas derived from introspective schools such as meditation and phenomenology, or management science.
None of these compete with Bayesianism in its home niche, though, as a formal theory of rational thinking. Hence my additional hedge, “technical understanding”. Bayesianism provides a rigorous mathematical theory, which makes precise claims. Competitors such as Popperian epistemology lack this property. This is one reason why Bayesian models are a go-to when trying to invent new statistical techniques or machine learning algorithms.
Was Bayesianism really the best technical understanding of practical epistemology at the time? Alternatives which can compete with it on these grounds include PAC and MDL methods. I won’t try to make a case against these here—just note that the claim I’m making is intended to contrast with those in particular, not with other philosophical schools nor with other concrete rationality practices.
Note: I don’t stand by all possible interpretations of this sentence. It should be hedged very carefully, but attempting to do so in the main text would have reduced clarity.
Bayesianism is not a theory of epistemology in the philosophical sense. It has no account of what knowledge is, and as a result, does not attempt to answer many of the questions which are primary concerns of the field. Instead, Bayesianism provides an account of what’s important: the information-theoretic processes which are going on in agents when developing true(er) beliefs, and the relationship between these information-theoretic processes and action. I therefore hedge with “practical epistemology”.
This, too, is not obviously not false, because Bayesianism is in many respects far from practical. While our community focuses on a praxis developed around the Bayesian model, it is not really clear that it is “the best” for this purpose: one might do better with techniques derived more from practice. There are schools of thought one might point to in this respect, such as whatever it is they teach in critical thinking courses these days, or ideas derived from introspective schools such as meditation and phenomenology, or management science.
None of these compete with Bayesianism in its home niche, though, as a formal theory of rational thinking. Hence my additional hedge, “technical understanding”. Bayesianism provides a rigorous mathematical theory, which makes precise claims. Competitors such as Popperian epistemology lack this property. This is one reason why Bayesian models are a go-to when trying to invent new statistical techniques or machine learning algorithms.
Was Bayesianism really the best technical understanding of practical epistemology at the time? Alternatives which can compete with it on these grounds include PAC and MDL methods. I won’t try to make a case against these here—just note that the claim I’m making is intended to contrast with those in particular, not with other philosophical schools nor with other concrete rationality practices.