I haven’t read this book, but I can’t see how Schelling would convincingly make this argument:
Leo Szilard has even pointed to the paradox that one might wish to confer immunity on foreign spies rather than subject them to prosecution, since they may be the only means by which the enemy can obtain persuasive evidence of the important truth that we are making no preparations for embarking on a surprise attack.
It’s true that enemy spies can provide a useful function, in allowing you to credibly signal self-serving information. However, deliberate, publicly-known policies of aiding enemy spies defeats the purpose, because at that point, it’s indistinguishable from counterespionage. After all, why not go one step further and feed spies truthful information? Same problem applies here.
I don’t quite see how conferring immunity on foreign spies would degrade the information they could access. Deliberately and openly feeding them information is going to be pointless, as they obviously can’t trust you. But encouraging foreign spies by not prosecuting them should not negatively affect their ability to obtain and relay information.
I still don’t see it. It doesn’t seem like any deliberate action could ever credibly signal “information only a spy could get”. It’s almost a problem of self-contradiction:
“I’m trying to tell you something that I’m trying to hide from you.”
To put it in more concrete terms, what if one day the US lifted all protocols for protecting information at its military bases and defense contractors? Would foreign espionage agencies think, “woot! Motherload!” Or would they think, “Sure, and it’s probably all junk … where are the real secrets?”
The signal isn’t to the opposing power—it’s to potential spies. You make recruiting easier for the opponent because you want to establish a fact about your plans and goals. The opponent will always have the problem of determining whether or not you’re feeding its spies disinformation, but having more independent spies can help with that.
So again, take it one step further: what would be wrong with subsidizing foreign spies? Say, pay a stipend to an account of their choice. Wouldn’t that make people even more willing to be spies?
That would probably work too, provided you could conclusively demonstrate that the payment system wasn’t some kind of trap (to address the concerns of potential spies) or attempt at counter-recruitment (to address the concerns of the opponent). That seems more difficult than simply declaring a policy of immunity and demonstrating it by not prosecuting caught spies.
ETA: Oh yeah, you also have to confirm that the people you are paying are actually doing the job you are paying them for, to wit, conveying accurate information to the opponent. It can’t just be a “sign up for anonymous cash payments” scheme. I can’t think of a way to simultaneously guarantee all these conditions, but if there is a way I’m not imaginative enough to see, then yeah, subsidizing the opponent’s spies would work.
You’re not aiding spies in getting information, you’re just lowering the risk they take, which encourages more spying. Someone in high position could leak information, only risking being fired, not being shot. This does not change the reliability of the information, which, in spying, is always in question anyway.
I haven’t read this book, but I can’t see how Schelling would convincingly make this argument:
It’s true that enemy spies can provide a useful function, in allowing you to credibly signal self-serving information. However, deliberate, publicly-known policies of aiding enemy spies defeats the purpose, because at that point, it’s indistinguishable from counterespionage. After all, why not go one step further and feed spies truthful information? Same problem applies here.
I don’t quite see how conferring immunity on foreign spies would degrade the information they could access. Deliberately and openly feeding them information is going to be pointless, as they obviously can’t trust you. But encouraging foreign spies by not prosecuting them should not negatively affect their ability to obtain and relay information.
I still don’t see it. It doesn’t seem like any deliberate action could ever credibly signal “information only a spy could get”. It’s almost a problem of self-contradiction:
“I’m trying to tell you something that I’m trying to hide from you.”
To put it in more concrete terms, what if one day the US lifted all protocols for protecting information at its military bases and defense contractors? Would foreign espionage agencies think, “woot! Motherload!” Or would they think, “Sure, and it’s probably all junk … where are the real secrets?”
The signal isn’t to the opposing power—it’s to potential spies. You make recruiting easier for the opponent because you want to establish a fact about your plans and goals. The opponent will always have the problem of determining whether or not you’re feeding its spies disinformation, but having more independent spies can help with that.
So again, take it one step further: what would be wrong with subsidizing foreign spies? Say, pay a stipend to an account of their choice. Wouldn’t that make people even more willing to be spies?
That would probably work too, provided you could conclusively demonstrate that the payment system wasn’t some kind of trap (to address the concerns of potential spies) or attempt at counter-recruitment (to address the concerns of the opponent). That seems more difficult than simply declaring a policy of immunity and demonstrating it by not prosecuting caught spies.
ETA: Oh yeah, you also have to confirm that the people you are paying are actually doing the job you are paying them for, to wit, conveying accurate information to the opponent. It can’t just be a “sign up for anonymous cash payments” scheme. I can’t think of a way to simultaneously guarantee all these conditions, but if there is a way I’m not imaginative enough to see, then yeah, subsidizing the opponent’s spies would work.
You’re not aiding spies in getting information, you’re just lowering the risk they take, which encourages more spying. Someone in high position could leak information, only risking being fired, not being shot. This does not change the reliability of the information, which, in spying, is always in question anyway.