On #3, the net effect of the Iran War (at least in conjunction with other recent events) is likely to increase rather than decrease proliferation in general and maybe even with respect to Iran specifically.
From the perspective of an American adversary:
Iran/Venezuela vs. DPRK shows just how vulnerable you are to an American attack if you don’t have nuclear weapons.
Yet, Iran has fought to (as of now) at least a draw and arguably a long-run strategic win against an extremely punishing American air assault while also demonstrating (as everyone has suspected since Iraq/Afghanistan) an American unwillingness to put boots on the ground.
No one has seriously alleged that Iran was engaged in any nuclear work since last summer, and no one has alleged (even unseriously) that Venezuela had nuclear ambitions. So, you’re not safe even if you don’t build nuclear weapons.
So, for most adversaries, you look at that and see a pretty clear upside to going nuclear (you’re safe) vs. a limited downside (an American air attack that might happen even if you’re not building nuclear weapons). Why not build?
From the perspective of a country that’s somewhere between neutral and allied with the US, you look out at the world and see:
The Iran War reflects (along with Ukraine) a new local maximum of predatory great power behavior.
Iran seems to have split the fault line in the US relationship with NATO into a full blow schism, so the situation looks much more tenuous for anyone relying on American protection.
And the US complete aversion to doing anything that actually endangers the lives of non-trivial numbers of US troops make the US look like a complete paper tiger even if you think they might want to protect you.
The US positioning on the Strait of Hormuz has suggested a complete indifference to the fate of Asian allies.
Many international actors are more concerned with what the US has done than what Iran was doing.
Once again, all signs point towards building nuclear weapons. I think we’re rapidly approaching the point where a technologically sophisticated American ally that could build nuclear weapons very fast (Taiwan, Japan) would be a fool not to.
On #3, the net effect of the Iran War (at least in conjunction with other recent events) is likely to increase rather than decrease proliferation in general and maybe even with respect to Iran specifically.
From the perspective of an American adversary:
Iran/Venezuela vs. DPRK shows just how vulnerable you are to an American attack if you don’t have nuclear weapons.
Yet, Iran has fought to (as of now) at least a draw and arguably a long-run strategic win against an extremely punishing American air assault while also demonstrating (as everyone has suspected since Iraq/Afghanistan) an American unwillingness to put boots on the ground.
No one has seriously alleged that Iran was engaged in any nuclear work since last summer, and no one has alleged (even unseriously) that Venezuela had nuclear ambitions. So, you’re not safe even if you don’t build nuclear weapons.
So, for most adversaries, you look at that and see a pretty clear upside to going nuclear (you’re safe) vs. a limited downside (an American air attack that might happen even if you’re not building nuclear weapons). Why not build?
From the perspective of a country that’s somewhere between neutral and allied with the US, you look out at the world and see:
The Iran War reflects (along with Ukraine) a new local maximum of predatory great power behavior.
Iran seems to have split the fault line in the US relationship with NATO into a full blow schism, so the situation looks much more tenuous for anyone relying on American protection.
And the US complete aversion to doing anything that actually endangers the lives of non-trivial numbers of US troops make the US look like a complete paper tiger even if you think they might want to protect you.
The US positioning on the Strait of Hormuz has suggested a complete indifference to the fate of Asian allies.
Many international actors are more concerned with what the US has done than what Iran was doing.
Once again, all signs point towards building nuclear weapons. I think we’re rapidly approaching the point where a technologically sophisticated American ally that could build nuclear weapons very fast (Taiwan, Japan) would be a fool not to.