It is not merely that a stock of true beliefs is vastly more likely to be helpful than a stock of false ones, but that the policy of aiming for the truth, of having and trying to satisfy a general (de dicto) desire for the truth—what we might simply call “critical inquiry”—is the best doxastic policy around. Anything else, as Charles Peirce correctly insists, lead to “a rapid deterioration of intellectual vigor.”—Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (2001) p. 179.
It is not merely that a stock of true beliefs is vastly more likely to be helpful than a stock of false ones, but that the policy of aiming for the truth, of having and trying to satisfy a general (de dicto) desire for the truth—what we might simply call “critical inquiry”—is the best doxastic policy around. Anything else, as Charles Peirce correctly insists, lead to “a rapid deterioration of intellectual vigor.”—Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (2001) p. 179.