I’d like to posit the hypothesis (epistemic status: uncertain) that if a person who is paying attention is presented with a strong, comprehensible argument for a correct conclusion, they will usually be persuaded.
Since the surgeon general’s report on the hazards of smoking, the rate of smoking among US adults has dropped fairly steadily from 42.4% to 11.6%, indicating that close to 3⁄4 of people who would otherwise smoke were persuaded not to. Pretty much everyone knows that the Earth is round. 81% of Americans have a an unfavorable view of Communism (vs 10% favorable), and Fascism is at 80% unfavorable vs. 5% favorable.
Basically, when the information is comprehensible and widely disseminated, a significant majority of people believe the sane thing and make the sane choice.
Perhaps (bounded) rationality is the rule, and exceptions are what call for explanation (e.g. motivated reasoning, inferential distance, intentional disinformation, respectability bias, etc.).
Are strong arguments persuasive by default?
I’d like to posit the hypothesis (epistemic status: uncertain) that if a person who is paying attention is presented with a strong, comprehensible argument for a correct conclusion, they will usually be persuaded.
Since the surgeon general’s report on the hazards of smoking, the rate of smoking among US adults has dropped fairly steadily from 42.4% to 11.6%, indicating that close to 3⁄4 of people who would otherwise smoke were persuaded not to. Pretty much everyone knows that the Earth is round. 81% of Americans have a an unfavorable view of Communism (vs 10% favorable), and Fascism is at 80% unfavorable vs. 5% favorable.
Basically, when the information is comprehensible and widely disseminated, a significant majority of people believe the sane thing and make the sane choice.
Perhaps (bounded) rationality is the rule, and exceptions are what call for explanation (e.g. motivated reasoning, inferential distance, intentional disinformation, respectability bias, etc.).