This sounds like an is-ought confusion.
“Some people would be happier as slaves.” is an is-statement—it’s either right or wrong (true or false) as a matter of fact, regardless of morality.
“Slavery oughtn’t exist” is a moral statement—it only has a truth value according to a particular ethical/moral set.
I don’t know whether “naturally suited for slavery” is supposed to be a “is” or an “ought” statement (descriptive or prescriptive). If it’s an is-statement then our moral sense is irrelevant to whether the statement is true or false as a matter of fact.
“Some people would be happier as slaves.” is an is-statement—it’s either right or wrong (true or false) as a matter of fact, regardless of morality.
I agree generally with your point, but this sentence assumes “happier” is an objective quality—which may not be true. if we were to taboo “happier” in that sentence, the new phrasing might include a moral claim. Consider:
“Everyone is happier if jocks can haze nerds without complaint” --> “Jocks by show virtue by hazing nerds, and nerds show virtue by accepting hazing without complaint.”
The second sentence contains a number of explicit and implicit moral claims. Those moral claims are also present in the first sentence, just concealed by the applause light word “happy.”
“Slavery oughtn’t exist” is a moral statement—it only has a truth value according to a particular ethical/moral set.
That; something we don’t know. Moral statements might be uniformly false (error theory), neither true nor false (expressivism), have singe non-relative truth values (moral realism) etc.
Just to mention my own view on the subject in a single line (though I ought really illustrate it with examples): I’m guessing that the moral algorithm in our brains is executing an unconscious estimation of our preferences while attempting a depersonalization of context.
As such a moral statement is on the one hand dependent on individual preferences (moral values) but on the other hand it can also be true/false on an objective level, as some parts of the above algorithm are objective and some are subjective.
But you might believe it’s moral to increase net happiness, or moral to enforce people’s rights, one of which is a right to personal autonomy. So it’s truth value is still only determined “according to a particular ethical/moral set.”
No., because your beliefs might be wrong. Aris was asserting relativism against error theory, non-congitivism and realism. Relativism is the claim that some set of statements have truth values, and have truth values that are relative to something. Relativism is not proven simply by producing evidence of conflicting beliefs.
A small note: I don’t consider myself a moral relativist, though I understand why my statement was misunderstood as such, as I was vastly simplifying my position. My actual position on morality probably needs a full discussion post to be fully explained.
I do think that for any X, X can only be called “morally wrong” according to some moral/ethical system, but I also think that there may exist objective criteria which might invalidate some moral/ethical systems altogether, or even rank (at least somewhat) the validity of the various moral/ethical systems.
I’m well aware they could be wrong—in fact that’s my whole point. The answer depends on which moral theory is true—even though only one theory is actually true. It’s a counterfactual.
Since Aris says they’re not a moral reletavist, I suspect this is at least similar to what they intended. If it’s not, I’d still endorse it.
why would an “ethciical/moral set” be what makes a moral claim (realistically) true? Realists tend to think claims are rendered true by some sort of fact.
The position of realism + belief in such a fact is one such “ethical/moral set”, as I meant it. I think that may have come across as referring to different terminal values or something?
I believe we’ve established that shminux’s position allows for some models to be made more accurate than others by events, not beliefs in events. I think these two positions are analogous.
Whoops! You’re entirely right; I should have read the parent-tree before responding, but I was confident that I knew what the conversation was. Retracted.
Sure. Which theory will be believed to be true depends on which facts are believed to be true, and which theory is actually true will depend on which facts are actually true. But beleiving one thing to be true becuae you believe another to be tirue is non argument for relativism, although careless wording can make it seem that way.
Do we, though? I think most people would agree that it’s acceptable to enslave sentient creatures that are actually happy under such a system—albeit reluctantly, due to the signalling implications—and this seems consistent with the fact that historically, societies kept slaves believed this (if not alieved it.)
Morally, we do know such a thing.
This sounds like an is-ought confusion. “Some people would be happier as slaves.” is an is-statement—it’s either right or wrong (true or false) as a matter of fact, regardless of morality. “Slavery oughtn’t exist” is a moral statement—it only has a truth value according to a particular ethical/moral set.
I don’t know whether “naturally suited for slavery” is supposed to be a “is” or an “ought” statement (descriptive or prescriptive). If it’s an is-statement then our moral sense is irrelevant to whether the statement is true or false as a matter of fact.
I agree generally with your point, but this sentence assumes “happier” is an objective quality—which may not be true. if we were to taboo “happier” in that sentence, the new phrasing might include a moral claim. Consider:
“Everyone is happier if jocks can haze nerds without complaint” --> “Jocks by show virtue by hazing nerds, and nerds show virtue by accepting hazing without complaint.”
The second sentence contains a number of explicit and implicit moral claims. Those moral claims are also present in the first sentence, just concealed by the applause light word “happy.”
That; something we don’t know. Moral statements might be uniformly false (error theory), neither true nor false (expressivism), have singe non-relative truth values (moral realism) etc.
Just to mention my own view on the subject in a single line (though I ought really illustrate it with examples): I’m guessing that the moral algorithm in our brains is executing an unconscious estimation of our preferences while attempting a depersonalization of context.
As such a moral statement is on the one hand dependent on individual preferences (moral values) but on the other hand it can also be true/false on an objective level, as some parts of the above algorithm are objective and some are subjective.
But you might believe it’s moral to increase net happiness, or moral to enforce people’s rights, one of which is a right to personal autonomy. So it’s truth value is still only determined “according to a particular ethical/moral set.”
No., because your beliefs might be wrong. Aris was asserting relativism against error theory, non-congitivism and realism. Relativism is the claim that some set of statements have truth values, and have truth values that are relative to something. Relativism is not proven simply by producing evidence of conflicting beliefs.
A small note: I don’t consider myself a moral relativist, though I understand why my statement was misunderstood as such, as I was vastly simplifying my position. My actual position on morality probably needs a full discussion post to be fully explained.
I do think that for any X, X can only be called “morally wrong” according to some moral/ethical system, but I also think that there may exist objective criteria which might invalidate some moral/ethical systems altogether, or even rank (at least somewhat) the validity of the various moral/ethical systems.
I’m well aware they could be wrong—in fact that’s my whole point. The answer depends on which moral theory is true—even though only one theory is actually true. It’s a counterfactual.
Since Aris says they’re not a moral reletavist, I suspect this is at least similar to what they intended. If it’s not, I’d still endorse it.
why would an “ethciical/moral set” be what makes a moral claim (realistically) true? Realists tend to think claims are rendered true by some sort of fact.
The position of realism + belief in such a fact is one such “ethical/moral set”, as I meant it. I think that may have come across as referring to different terminal values or something?
Realists think claims are made true by facts, not beliefs in facts.
I believe we’ve established that shminux’s position allows for some models to be made more accurate than others by events, not beliefs in events. I think these two positions are analogous.
Different conversation ;)
We’re talking about moral realism here, sort of.
Whoops! You’re entirely right; I should have read the parent-tree before responding, but I was confident that I knew what the conversation was. Retracted.
Right, but it depends which facts are true. The answer is contingent on these disputed facts.
ETA: edited for wording.
Sure. Which theory will be believed to be true depends on which facts are believed to be true, and which theory is actually true will depend on which facts are actually true. But beleiving one thing to be true becuae you believe another to be tirue is non argument for relativism, although careless wording can make it seem that way.
Sorry, I’m having trouble parsing that :( Possibly because I’m misreading the typos?
Do we, though? I think most people would agree that it’s acceptable to enslave sentient creatures that are actually happy under such a system—albeit reluctantly, due to the signalling implications—and this seems consistent with the fact that historically, societies kept slaves believed this (if not alieved it.)