I don’t understand why you’d continue arguing definitions about speed of Solomonoff induction or it being “the original problem”. It’s clear what we both mean.
I believe you are wrong about general statements about what needs to be done to implement approximate Solomonoff induction. Since we don’t technically define in what sense this approximation has to be general, there remain possibilities for a good technical definition that preserves “generality” in an approximate implementation.
don’t understand why you’d continue arguing definitions about speed of Solomonoff induction or it being “the original problem”. It’s clear what we both mean.
A better question would be why you brought up the issue. We both knew what the other meant before that, but you kept bringing it up.
I believe you are wrong … there remain possibilities for a good technical definition that preserves “generality” in an approximate implementation.
Okay, well, I’ll believe it when I see it. In the mean time, I suspect it will be far more productive to exploit whatever regularity we already know about the environment, and work on building that into the inference program’s prior. (Arguably, even the Occamian prior does that by using our hard-won belief in the universe’s preference for simplicity!)
To wrap up (as an alternative to not replying):
I don’t understand why you’d continue arguing definitions about speed of Solomonoff induction or it being “the original problem”. It’s clear what we both mean.
I believe you are wrong about general statements about what needs to be done to implement approximate Solomonoff induction. Since we don’t technically define in what sense this approximation has to be general, there remain possibilities for a good technical definition that preserves “generality” in an approximate implementation.
A better question would be why you brought up the issue. We both knew what the other meant before that, but you kept bringing it up.
Okay, well, I’ll believe it when I see it. In the mean time, I suspect it will be far more productive to exploit whatever regularity we already know about the environment, and work on building that into the inference program’s prior. (Arguably, even the Occamian prior does that by using our hard-won belief in the universe’s preference for simplicity!)