I’m puzzled by Eliezer’s comments on the Nixon example. How is “Republicans are not pacifists” going to make Republicans feel unwelcome? That would require either (1) that it be seen as an insult to Republicans or (2) that it be seen as an obnoxious stereotyping of Republicans. But (1) lots of people—the great majority, I think—are not-pacifists and generally no one thinks any the worse of them for it; indeed my impression is that far more people think that pacifism is foolish than think that not-pacifism is evil; and (2) since (a) the whole point of the example is that generalizations like these should generally be taken as approximations only and (b) it is in fact a very good generalization that Republicans are not pacifists (note: I have no statistical evidence for this, and am willing to be refuted; but I don’t expect to be), it seems unlikely that many Republicans will feel insulted by being told that Republicans are generally not pacifists.
Now, I happen not to be a Republican (or a pacifist or a Quaker) myself, so I don’t entirely trust my intuitions about how members of those groups might react to the example. So:
Am I missing something? Is anyone reading this a Republican who would feel insulted or over-pigeonholed by seeing the example Eliezer cites in a textbook or lecture?
(For the avoidance of doubt: I agree with the general point Eliezer is making; it just seems to me like he could have chosen a better example.)
As soon as you make any statements with political or ideological content, the way people understand them will be determined by their informal signaling implications much more strongly than by their literal content and its formal logical implications. This is especially true if such statements are made abruptly in an unrelated context. Sometimes people really mean innocently only what they literally say and are surprised at the reactions to the unintended signaling, but more often signaling is a part of the speaker’s intention (though of course its effects can be mispredicted).
In this case, the Nixon example is meant to send a clear ideological signal (whose details I won’t spell out to avoid making potentially contentious statements). Moreover, the use of the example in a totally unrelated context, in a document intended for a community of technical experts, signals that ideological agreement is expected in this community and places dissenters in a position where they have to take it in silence (thus confirming their low status) or protest loudly and expose themselves to ridicule (or worse).
Some historical background might be relevant: Nixon’s political opponents, at the time, used the conflict between his Quaker affiliation and his aggressive politics as evidence of dishonesty. Citation courtesy of a recent Boing Boing article:
In 1968, candidate Richard Nixon promised to bring the troops home from Viet Nam. Two years later, as the war escalated, anti-Nixon forces accused the president of hypocrisy (above, right) in light of his religious background—Quakers are pacifists.
It is, as Eliezer points out, a distracting example, regardless of whether it is an insulting one.
OK, so that would mean that Nixon supporters might find the example distractingly offensive, which might well be a reason not to use it. But Eliezer said Republicans, and the two aren’t quite the same.
(After Watergate I think there were rather few Nixon supporters—meaning, in this context, people who would be offended by the suggestion that there might be anything suspect about Nixon’s integrity—even among Republicans. When did the “Nixon diamond” start being used as an example in AI?)
Sorry — I didn’t mean to imply that an example had to be offensive in order to be distracting. Simply bringing up a matter of partisan conflict in the recent past can be already distracting, even if it’s not personally offensive to any single reader.
I’m puzzled by Eliezer’s comments on the Nixon example. How is “Republicans are not pacifists” going to make Republicans feel unwelcome? That would require either (1) that it be seen as an insult to Republicans or (2) that it be seen as an obnoxious stereotyping of Republicans. But (1) lots of people—the great majority, I think—are not-pacifists and generally no one thinks any the worse of them for it; indeed my impression is that far more people think that pacifism is foolish than think that not-pacifism is evil; and (2) since (a) the whole point of the example is that generalizations like these should generally be taken as approximations only and (b) it is in fact a very good generalization that Republicans are not pacifists (note: I have no statistical evidence for this, and am willing to be refuted; but I don’t expect to be), it seems unlikely that many Republicans will feel insulted by being told that Republicans are generally not pacifists.
Now, I happen not to be a Republican (or a pacifist or a Quaker) myself, so I don’t entirely trust my intuitions about how members of those groups might react to the example. So:
Am I missing something? Is anyone reading this a Republican who would feel insulted or over-pigeonholed by seeing the example Eliezer cites in a textbook or lecture?
(For the avoidance of doubt: I agree with the general point Eliezer is making; it just seems to me like he could have chosen a better example.)
As soon as you make any statements with political or ideological content, the way people understand them will be determined by their informal signaling implications much more strongly than by their literal content and its formal logical implications. This is especially true if such statements are made abruptly in an unrelated context. Sometimes people really mean innocently only what they literally say and are surprised at the reactions to the unintended signaling, but more often signaling is a part of the speaker’s intention (though of course its effects can be mispredicted).
In this case, the Nixon example is meant to send a clear ideological signal (whose details I won’t spell out to avoid making potentially contentious statements). Moreover, the use of the example in a totally unrelated context, in a document intended for a community of technical experts, signals that ideological agreement is expected in this community and places dissenters in a position where they have to take it in silence (thus confirming their low status) or protest loudly and expose themselves to ridicule (or worse).
Some historical background might be relevant: Nixon’s political opponents, at the time, used the conflict between his Quaker affiliation and his aggressive politics as evidence of dishonesty. Citation courtesy of a recent Boing Boing article:
http://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-meanest-u-s-political-campaign-buttons/
It is, as Eliezer points out, a distracting example, regardless of whether it is an insulting one.
OK, so that would mean that Nixon supporters might find the example distractingly offensive, which might well be a reason not to use it. But Eliezer said Republicans, and the two aren’t quite the same.
(After Watergate I think there were rather few Nixon supporters—meaning, in this context, people who would be offended by the suggestion that there might be anything suspect about Nixon’s integrity—even among Republicans. When did the “Nixon diamond” start being used as an example in AI?)
Sorry — I didn’t mean to imply that an example had to be offensive in order to be distracting. Simply bringing up a matter of partisan conflict in the recent past can be already distracting, even if it’s not personally offensive to any single reader.