Well, it seems I’m utterly confused about subjective experience, even more so than I thought before. Thanks for calling my bs, again.
My first question is: how am I supposed to have arrived at that state? I can’t imagine it, personally. It seems utterly implausible… I can’t think of any amount of observation that would raise my confidence that high [...] Implausible situations ought to produce implausible behavior.
I can’t imagine it either. This could be an argument against thought experiments in general.
EDIT: Or are you asking how confident I am, given 1-epsilon confidence that TOOD is a perfect copy of me, that there isn’t some other imperceptible aspect of me, X, which this perfect copy does not contain which would be necessary for it to share my personal identity?
If I copied myself, I expect HR1 and HR2 would both think they’re the real HR1. HR1 wouldn’t have the subjective experience of HR2, and vice versa. Basically they cease to be copies when they start receiving different sensory information. For HR1, the decision to terminate his own subjective experience seems like suicide, and for HR2, termination of subjective experience seems like being murdered. I can’t wrap my head around this stuff, and I can’t even reliably pinpoint where my source of confusion lies. Thinking about TOD and TODD is much easier, since I haven’t experienced being either one, so they seem perfectly isomorphic to me.
It seems if you make a perfect physical copy, what makes your subjective experience personal should be part of it, since it must be physics, but I can’t imagine how copying it would be like. Will there be some kind of unified consciousness of two subjective experiences at once?
I’m not sure English is sufficient to convey my meaning, if you have no idea of what I’m talking about. In that case it’s probably better not to make this mess even worse.
Well, it seems I’m utterly confused about subjective experience, even more so than I thought before. Thanks for calling my bs, again.
I can’t imagine it either. This could be an argument against thought experiments in general.
If I copied myself, I expect HR1 and HR2 would both think they’re the real HR1. HR1 wouldn’t have the subjective experience of HR2, and vice versa. Basically they cease to be copies when they start receiving different sensory information. For HR1, the decision to terminate his own subjective experience seems like suicide, and for HR2, termination of subjective experience seems like being murdered. I can’t wrap my head around this stuff, and I can’t even reliably pinpoint where my source of confusion lies. Thinking about TOD and TODD is much easier, since I haven’t experienced being either one, so they seem perfectly isomorphic to me.
It seems if you make a perfect physical copy, what makes your subjective experience personal should be part of it, since it must be physics, but I can’t imagine how copying it would be like. Will there be some kind of unified consciousness of two subjective experiences at once?
I’m not sure English is sufficient to convey my meaning, if you have no idea of what I’m talking about. In that case it’s probably better not to make this mess even worse.