Maybe you already got this part, but time preference is orthogonal to copies vs originals.
Eliezer says he defines personal identity in part by causal connections, which exist between you and the “clone” as well as between you and your “original” in the future. This definition also suggests a hole in your argument for strong time preference.
You are misreading me. I don’t have time preference. If an exact perfect replica of me were made, it would not be me even at the moment of duplication.
I have continuation-of-computation preference. This is much stricter than Eliezer’s causal connection based identity, but also avoids many weird predictions which arise from that.
And yes, you would need a bright line in this case. Fuzziness is in the map, not the territory on this item.
We certainly don’t need a bright line.
Maybe you already got this part, but time preference is orthogonal to copies vs originals.
Eliezer says he defines personal identity in part by causal connections, which exist between you and the “clone” as well as between you and your “original” in the future. This definition also suggests a hole in your argument for strong time preference.
You are misreading me. I don’t have time preference. If an exact perfect replica of me were made, it would not be me even at the moment of duplication.
I have continuation-of-computation preference. This is much stricter than Eliezer’s causal connection based identity, but also avoids many weird predictions which arise from that.
And yes, you would need a bright line in this case. Fuzziness is in the map, not the territory on this item.