My main argument is that most likely none of us really knows enough about mathematics of quantum mechanics to follow emergence of patterns of observable universe out of MWI. My quantum maths stops at quantum computing, which is MWI-interpretable, and Copenhagen-interpretable equally well.
The second argument is that our view of physics is incomplete—we don’t know about quantum gravity, our cosmology is ridiculous, filled with inflation, dark matter, dark energy etc., we don’t know if there are any tiny non-linearities in 200th decimal place with quantum systems (no physical law so far withstood this). MWI completely fails if any such non-linearities are present, while other theories can handle them. Quantum computers are also spectacularly precise quantum effect measurement devices, so we might find that out.
I find the case for MWI decent, but nowhere near as overwhelming as the usual examples of theism and marijuana legalization. It can collapse with one experiment, and I’m not betting against such experiment happening in my lifetime at odds higher than 10:1.
MWI completely fails if any such non-linearities are present, while other theories can handle them.
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It can collapse with one experiment, and I’m not betting against such experiment happening in my lifetime at odds higher than 10:1.
So you’re saying MWI tells us what to anticipate more specifically (and therefore makes itself more falsifiable) than the alternatives, and that’s a point against it?
The possibility of future evidence against some hypothesis isn’t evidence against that hypothesis. It also isn’t evidence for that hypothesis. The only experiments that count are the ones that have actually been done.
What are the probabilities, given Many Worlds or Collapse quantum mechanics, that in our past investigations of sub atomic particles, we would have encountered some non linear term in the Schrodinger equation? I would say this has a higher probability in the collapse theory that would not be falsified by it, and thus its absence does in fact favor Many Worlds.
The claim I’m making is that Eliezer’s acting as if MWI was proven beyond any possibility of doubt, just as non-existence of the Christian god, is not justified.
MWI is a decent interpretation, but preference for it is based mostly on different intuitions on what counts as mathematical simplicity (as data is agnostic between interpretations now), and it might get invalidated in a single experiment—which is not that terribly unlikely to happen, given past performance of our physical theories.
It’s the point against certainty about MWI, not against MWI.
If we go down to 200th decimal place and find perfect linearity, it would be weak evidence for MWI (because other interpretations are fairly agnostic about it).
My main argument is that most likely none of us really knows enough about mathematics of quantum mechanics to follow emergence of patterns of observable universe out of MWI. My quantum maths stops at quantum computing, which is MWI-interpretable, and Copenhagen-interpretable equally well.
The second argument is that our view of physics is incomplete—we don’t know about quantum gravity, our cosmology is ridiculous, filled with inflation, dark matter, dark energy etc., we don’t know if there are any tiny non-linearities in 200th decimal place with quantum systems (no physical law so far withstood this). MWI completely fails if any such non-linearities are present, while other theories can handle them. Quantum computers are also spectacularly precise quantum effect measurement devices, so we might find that out.
I find the case for MWI decent, but nowhere near as overwhelming as the usual examples of theism and marijuana legalization. It can collapse with one experiment, and I’m not betting against such experiment happening in my lifetime at odds higher than 10:1.
Here’s amusing quantum effect to think about
So you’re saying MWI tells us what to anticipate more specifically (and therefore makes itself more falsifiable) than the alternatives, and that’s a point against it?
The possibility of future evidence against some hypothesis isn’t evidence against that hypothesis. It also isn’t evidence for that hypothesis. The only experiments that count are the ones that have actually been done.
The absence of evidence against a hypothesis that other hypotheses predict you would encounter is evidence in favor of that hypothesis.
Right, but only if they predict you’d encounter the evidence in situations that have actually happened.
What are the probabilities, given Many Worlds or Collapse quantum mechanics, that in our past investigations of sub atomic particles, we would have encountered some non linear term in the Schrodinger equation? I would say this has a higher probability in the collapse theory that would not be falsified by it, and thus its absence does in fact favor Many Worlds.
Sure, it’s just that taw and simpleton both seemed to be making stronger claims than that.
The claim I’m making is that Eliezer’s acting as if MWI was proven beyond any possibility of doubt, just as non-existence of the Christian god, is not justified.
MWI is a decent interpretation, but preference for it is based mostly on different intuitions on what counts as mathematical simplicity (as data is agnostic between interpretations now), and it might get invalidated in a single experiment—which is not that terribly unlikely to happen, given past performance of our physical theories.
It’s the point against certainty about MWI, not against MWI.
If we go down to 200th decimal place and find perfect linearity, it would be weak evidence for MWI (because other interpretations are fairly agnostic about it).