Section 3 begins with a conceptual argument suggesting that DSM-based choice under uncertainty will not, even behaviourally, effectively alter the agent’s preferences over time.
Hold up, does this mean you don’t have a proof that agents who are Certain about their Tree are trammelled or not?
EDIT: Ah, I see you confirm that in section 3. Good to know.
I take certainty to be a special case of uncertainty. Regarding proof, the relevant bit is here:
This argument does not apply when the agent is unaware of the structure of its decision tree, so I provide some formal results for these cases which bound the extent to which preferences can de facto be completed. … These results apply naturally to cases in which agents are unaware of the state space, but readers sceptical of the earlier conceptual argument can re-purpose them to make analogous claims in standard cases of certainty and uncertainty.
Hold up, does this mean you don’t have a proof that agents who are Certain about their Tree are trammelled or not?
EDIT: Ah, I see you confirm that in section 3. Good to know.
I take certainty to be a special case of uncertainty. Regarding proof, the relevant bit is here: